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A Global Public Goods Perspective on the
Legitimacy of the International Criminal
Court
ALEXANDRE SKANDER GALAND
ABSTRACT
The International Criminal Court (“ICC” or “Court”) is facing its
worst crisis since its creation. At the end of 2016, three States decided to
withdraw from the Rome Statute, which suggests there is a risk that the
entire institution is falling apart. As early as 2014, the Court was in trouble, as a legitimacy debate arose in the wake of a compliance debacle
with respect to the situations in Sudan, Libya and Kenya. In order to
achieve effective prosecutions and trials, the Court needs States’ cooperation. This article will show that there are three interdependent legitimacy
issues that have been raised for non-compliance with the ICC, which relate to the institutional design necessary to effectively provide a global
public good. Moreover, it will demonstrate that the Court’s investigations
and prosecution in these three States is affected by source, procedural and
outcome legitimacy eroding factors. Due to the entanglement between
source and procedural legitimacy, we may have to consider tying both
together. On first glance, a compliance pull could be generated by, when
source legitimacy is lacking, strictly sticking to the State’s interest in the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion as to who to prosecute. This article
will argue that the latter option would create a global public bad, as it
entails negative externalities and excludes some victims from benefitting
from the Court. Nonetheless, this article will show that such calculations
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are already made with regards to so-called self-referrals (i.e., where
source legitimacy is not questioned). With respect to outcome legitimacy,
this article will argue that the ICC is a victim of the Security Council’s
(“SC”) inability to exercise the responsibility assigned to it by the United
Nations Charter and the Rome Statute.
INTRODUCTION
The International Criminal Court (“ICC” or “Court”) is facing its
worst crisis since its creation. As of 2014, the Court qualified as being in
trouble. Indeed, a legitimacy debate arose in the wake of a decision by
the Prosecutor to drop its charges against the President of Kenya, Uhuru
Kenyatta, the week after the Prosecutor decided to halt its investigations
into international crimes committed in Darfur, Sudan. Both decisions of
the Prosecutor were taken due to a lack of cooperation by the authorities
of Kenya and Sudan. The poor record of the Court, including two convictions (now four) in more than ten years, and these two dismissals, raised
the question as to whether the Court was “irrelevant or legitimate.” Now
that States are considering leaving the Court, there is a serious risk that
the institution may fall apart entirely. 1 Its legitimacy needs to be “bootstrapped.”2

1. South Africa and The Gambia have revoked their withdrawals. However, the African Union (AU) recently passed a resolution to collectively support a strategy to withdraw from the ICC.
e.g. Assembly of the African Union, 28th Sess., Int’l Crim. Ct. Doc. EX.CL/1006(XXX) (Jan. 3031, 2017) (containing the African Union’s resolution to collectively support a strategy to withdraw
from the ICC); South Africa Withdrawal to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
S. Afr., Oct. 25, 2016, U.N. Doc. C.N.786.2016x.TREATIES-XVIII.10 (noting that South Africa
deposited its instrument of withdrawal on 19 October 2016); South Africa Notification of Withdrawal to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, S. Afr., March 7, 2017, U.N. Doc.
C.N.121.2017.TREATIES-XVIII.10 (stating that on March 7, 2017, the Government of South Africa notified the Secretary-General of the revocation of its notification of withdrawal from the Rome
Statute); Burundi Withdrawal to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Burundi,
Oct. 27, 2016, U.N. Doc. C.N.805.2016.TREATIES-XVIII.10 (containing Burundi’s instrument of
withdrawal from the Rome Statute on 27 October 2016); Gambia Withdrawal to the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court, Gam. Nov. 10, 2016, U.N. Doc. C.N.862.2016.TREATIESXVIII.10 (containing Gambia’s instrument of withdrawal deposited on 10 November 2016); Gambia Notification of Withdrawal to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Gam. Feb.
10, 2017, U.N. Doc. C.N.62.2017.TREATIES-XVIII.10 (containing the Government of The Gambia’s notification to the Secretary-General of its decision to rescind its notification of withdrawal
from the Rome Statute).
2. Larry May & Shannon Fyfe, The Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals, in THE
LEGITIMACY OF INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL 25, 35-40 (Nobuo Hayashi et al. eds., 2017).
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It is one of the main assumptions in the (sociological) literature that
a court with which States comply is a legitimate court.3 The Rome Statute
explicitly obliges its States Parties to execute requests for cooperation
and assistance issued by the Court.4 And, indeed, in order to achieve effective prosecution and trials the Court needs States Parties and their cooperation.5 The Court has referred dozens of findings of non-cooperation
in relation to the situations in Sudan and Libya to the Security Council
(“SC”), and one finding of non-cooperation in relation to the situation in
Kenya to the Assembly of States Parties (“ASP”).
This article will show that in the situations in Darfur, Kenya and
Libya, there are three interdependent legitimacy issues that have been
raised for non-compliance with the ICC which also relate to the institutional design necessary to effectively provide a global public good
(“GPG”). The first section chronicles (1) how non-compliance occurred
in Darfur, Sudan, Libya and Kenya.6 The second section details the legitimacy issues faced in these three situations by grouping legitimacy issues
based on normative grounds, namely, source legitimacy, process legitimacy, and outcome legitimacy.7 The third and final section analyzes the
concept of global public goods and demonstrates how the challenges
against impunity can be considered such a good and also show that the
ICC was created to provide this good. This final section then parallels
each legitimacy ground with methods developed in the GPG literature to
tackle such problems, namely non-consensualism, reciprocity, and distributive conflicts.8
I. CHRONICLES OF NON-COMPLIANCE
Antonio Cassese famously described the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) as “a giant without arms and
legs [which] needs artificial limbs to walk and work” - the artificial limbs
were obviously State authorities.9 Like the ICTY, the ICC depends on
State authorities to fulfill its functions. Darfur (Sudan), Libya, and Kenya
3. See Başak Çalı, Anne Koch, & Nicola Bruch, The Legitimacy of Human Rights Courts: A
Grounded Interpretivist Analysis of the European Court of Human Rights, 35 H.R.Q. 955, 959
(2013).
4. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 86, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 183/9
(1998) [hereinafter “Rome Statute”].
5. Antonio Cassese, On the Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment
of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, 9 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 2, 13 (1998).
6. See infra Sections I.A-C.
7. See infra Sections II.A-C.
8. See infra Sections III.A-C.
9. Casese, supra note 5, at 13.
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are situations where the ICC has not been able to effectively “walk and
work.” These situations are not the only ones where a State failed to cooperate with the Court.10 They do, however, represent the apex of noncooperation as they triggered the use of Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute
to its fullest extent. Article 87(7), which regulates the procedure to make
a finding of non-compliance, reads as follows:
Where a State Party fails to comply with a request to cooperate by the
Court contrary to the provisions of this Statute, thereby preventing the
Court from exercising its functions and powers under this Statute, the
Court may make a finding to that effect and refer the matter to the
Assembly of States Parties or, where the Security Council referred the
matter to the Court, to the Security Council.11

The first part of Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute requires first, that
there is a “fail[ure] to comply with a request to cooperate” and, second,
this failure is of certain gravity in that it must prevent “the Court from
exercising its functions and powers.”12 The second part of the provision
makes clear that the Court’s powers are discretionary ones, as it “may”
make a finding of non-compliance and “may” refer the matter to the ASP
or the SC.13 Thus, a finding of non-compliance does not necessarily follow an objective failure to comply. In the same vein, a finding of noncompliance will not always be followed by a referral to the ASP or SC.
The latter measure is, in the Appeals Chamber’s view, one course of action “that may be sought when the Chamber concludes that it is the most
effective way of obtaining cooperation in the concrete circumstances at
hand.”14 Referrals to the ASP and/or the SC can be conceived in two
ways: first as disciplinary measures, and second, as seeking assistance
from external actors. As explained in the following sections, the circumstances and (il)legitimacy grounds, in which each situation develops until
it reaches a climax shows how these two purposes can either easily be
blurred or kept distinct.

10. See ICC Official Documents-Arrest Warrants, ICC Fᴏʀᴜᴍ, http://iccforum.com/background/arrest (last visited Nov. 3, 2017) (listing several public warrants that remain outstanding as
of 2015: Côte d’Ivoire: Simone Gbagbo, since 2012; Democratic Republic of the Congo: Sylvestre
Mudacumura, since 2012; Uganda: Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti and Okot Odhiambo, since 2005).
11. Rome Statute supra note 4, art. 87(7).
12. Id.
13. Id.; see also Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11-1032, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Appeal Against Trial Chamber V(B)’s “Decision on Prosecution’s Application for a Finding
of Non-Compliance under Article 87(7) of the Statute”, ¶ 55 (Aug. 19, 2015).
14. Id. ¶ 51 (emphasis in original).
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A. Sudan
The situation in the Darfur region of Sudan ended up before the ICC,
as a result of Resolution 1593 adopted by the SC under Chapter VII on
31 March 2005.15 The first operative paragraph of SC Resolution 1593
“refer[s] the situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court.”16 This referral clause is followed by a paragraph which “[d]ecides that the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur, shall cooperate fully with and provide any
necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution.”17 The same paragraph also recognizes that “States not party to
the Rome Statute have no obligation under the Statute,” but still “urges
all States and concerned regional and other international organizations to
cooperate fully.”18
Apart from the subsequent deployment of a joint United NationsAfrican Union peacekeeping mission, the SC referral is among the only
significant reactions of the international community to the crisis in Darfur.19 Since the SC referral, nine individuals have been warranted or summoned by the Court.20 The most well-known ICC case is against Omar
Hassan Al-Bashir, president of Sudan. Two arrest warrants were issued
against Al-Bashir; the first arrest warrant for war crimes and crimes
against humanity was issued on March 4, 2009,21 the second warrant for
genocide was issued on July 12, 2010.22
Only seven days after the Prosecutor had applied for Al-Bashir’s
warrant, the African Union (AU) undertook to establish a high-level panel
on Darfur.23 The AU high level panel was tasked with recommending African solutions to effectively address, accountability, on the one hand, and

15. S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 1 (Mar. 31, 2005).
16. Id. ¶ 1.
17. Id. ¶ 2.
18. Id.
19. International Response to the Darfur Genocide, GALE GROUP (2014), link.galegroup.com
/apps/doc/GXQKOE926533637/SUIC?u=nysl_ce_cazehs&xid=b313f1ad.
20. The Court Today, THE INT’L CRIMINAL COURT (Oct. 27, 2017) https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/TheCourtTodayEng.pdf.
21. Id.
22. ICC issues a warrant of arrest for Omar Al Bashir, President of Sudan, THE INT’ L
CRIMINAL COURT (Mar. 4, 2009) https://www.icc-cpi.int/legalAidConsultations?name=icc+issues
+a+warrant+of+arrest+for+omar+al+bashir_+president+of+sudan; Pre-Trial Chamber I issues a
second warrant of arrest against Omar Al Bashir for counts of genocide, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT (Jul. 12, 2010), https://www.icc-cpi.int/legalAidConsultations?name=pr557.
23. Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Communique of the 142nd Meeting, Doc.
PSC/MIN/Comm(CXLII) (July 21, 2008).
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peace, on the other.24 By the same token, the AU made a request to the
SC for the situation in Darfur to be deferred.25 These measures were followed with a resolution binding on AU States not to enforce the arrest
warrant against Al-Bashir.26
The ICC arrest warrants against Al-Bashir were transmitted to the
Sudanese authorities, all States party to the Rome Statute, and all SC
members not party to the Rome Statute.27 The warrants requested cooperation in arresting and surrendering Al-Bashir to the ICC.28 But, only the
Sudanese authorities and the States party to the Rome Statute were formally obliged to comply with the request of cooperation.29 In principle,
this would have meant that Al-Bashir was becoming isolated, as entering
the territory of an ICC State party meant being surrendered to the ICC to
face trial.30 Nevertheless, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) reported
in 2016 that “Al Bashir has crossed international borders on 131 occasions since March 2009, on 14 occasions to State Parties, and on 117 occasions to non-State Parties.”31
The ICC Al-Bashir docket is excessively loaded with requests for
his arrest and surrender to the ICC followed by findings of non-compliance.32 Importantly, the ICC decisions on the failure to comply with the
24. Id.; Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Communique of the 207th Meeting,
Doc. PSC/AHG/COMM.2(CCVII) (Oct. 29, 2009).
25. Communique of the 142nd Meeting, supra note 23, at 19.
26. Assembly of the African Union, Thirteenth Ordinary Session, Decision on the Meeting of
African States Parties to the Statute of the International Criminal Court, Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.245(XIII) Rev.1, ¶ 10 (July 3, 2009).
27. Dapo Akande, The Legal Nature of Security Council Referrals to the ICC and Its Impact
on Al Bashir’s Immunities, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 333, 333-34 (2009).
28. Id. at 334.
29. Rome Statute, supra note 4, arts. 86, 89; S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 15, ¶ 1; Akande, supra
note 27, at 334; see Rome Statute art. 87(5)(a).
30. See Payam Akhavan, Are International Criminal Tribunals a Disincentive to Peace: Reconciling Judicial Romanticism with Political Realism, 31 Hᴜᴍ. RTS. Q. 624 (2009).
31. ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, before the
United Nations Security Council on the Situation in Darfur, pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), ¶ 13
(Dec. 13, 2016).
32. See e.g. Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-109, Decision Informing the United
Nations Security Council and the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute about Omar AlBashir’s Recent Visit to the Republic of Chad (Aug. 27, 2010); Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, ICC-02/0501/09-139, Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Failure by the Republic
of Malawi to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the Arrest
and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir (Dec. 12, 2011) [hereinafter Decision on Malawi’s Non-Compliance]; Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-140, Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Refusal of the Republic of Chad to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan
Ahmad Al Bashir (Dec. 13, 2011); Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the Noncompliance of the Republic of Chad with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court Regarding
the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir (Mar. 26, 2013); Prosecutor v. Al-
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request to arrest and surrender Al-Bashir do not only concern the failure
of Sudan to cooperate, but also the failure of State parties to cooperate,
allowing Al-Bashir to travel unimpeded.33 Indeed, Pre-Trial Chamber
(PTC) II has referred Malawi, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC), Djibouti, and Uganda for their failure to comply with the ICC
request to arrest and surrender Al-Bashir to the Court.34 On the other
hand, the PTC declined to refer Nigeria and South Africa to the SC, as it
believed that such referrals were not warranted due to the respective authorities’ good faith.35
Al-Bashir is not the only Sudanese accused of having committed
crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. Abdel Raheem Hussein, Minister of National Defence (at the time of the issuance of his warrant), Ahmad Harun, Minister State for Humanitarian Affairs (at the time of the
issuance of his warrant), and Ali Kushayb (Janjaweed leader associated
with the Sudanese government) have been indicted for war crimes and
crimes against humanity.36 The Government of Sudan made clear in several public appearances that it does not intend to cooperate with any of
these proceedings.37 The failure of Sudan to arrest and surrender these

Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-195, Decision on the Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo Regarding Omar Al-Bashir’s Arrest and Surrender to the Court (Apr. 9, 2014) [hereinafter
Decision on DRC’s Non-Compliance]; Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-227, Decision
on the Prosecutor’s Request for a Finding of Non-Compliance Against the Republic of the Sudan
(March 9 2015); Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-266, Decision on the Non-Compliance
by the Republic of Djibouti with the Request to Arrest and Surrender Omar Al-Bashir to the Court
and Referring the Matter to the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of States Parties
to the Rome Statute (July 11, 2016) [hereinafter Decision on Djibouti’s Non-Compliance]; Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-267, Decision on the Non-Compliance by the Republic of
Uganda with the Request to Arrest and Surrender Omar Al-Bashir to the Court and Referring the
Matter to the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome
Statute (July 11, 2016) [hereinafter Decision on Uganda’s Non-Compliance]; Prosecutor v. Al
Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-302, Decision Under Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Non-Compliance by South Africa with the Request by the Court for the Arrest and Surrender of Omar AlBashir (July 6, 2017) [hereinafter Decision on South Africa’s Non-Compliance].
33. Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, before the United Nations Security Council on the Situation in Darfur, supra note 31, ¶ 10.
34. Decision on Malawi’s Non-Compliance, supra note 32, ¶ 47; Decision on DRC’s NonCompliance, supra note 32, ¶ 34; Decision on Djibouti’s Non-Compliance, supra note 32, ¶ 18;
Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-140, ¶ 14.
35. Prosecutor v Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the Cooperation of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Regarding Omar Al-Bashir’s Arrest and Surrender to the Court, ¶ 13 (Sept. 5,
2013); Decision South Africa’s Non-Compliance, supra note 32, ¶¶ 127-134.
36. Communique of the 142nd Meeting, supra note 23, at 19.
37. Prosecutor v. Harun, ICC-02/05-0l/07-48, Public Redacted Version of Prosecution Request for a Finding on the Non-Cooperation of the Government of the Sudan in the Case of The
Prosecutor v. Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb, pursuant to Article 87 of the Rome Statute (Apr. 19,
2010).
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Sudanese individuals close to Al-Bashir have also been referred to the SC
under Article 87 of the Rome Statute.38
Like Al-Bashir, Abdel Raheem Hussein was found to have travelled
to ICC States Parties, namely Chad and Central African Republic, without being arrested.39 PTC II, however, found that it was not necessary to
make findings of non-compliance for these two situations, as both States
explained that they had been surprised by the presence of Hussein on their
territory, and the pending order to arrest and surrender him to the ICC. 40
These two lenient decisions were however immediately followed by a
decision to refer Sudan to the SC for its “long history of determined and
consistent failure to comply with UNSC Resolution 1593.”41
The ICC also investigated crimes committed by groups fighting the
Sudanese government.42 In mid-2009, the ICC issued summons to Abdallah Banda, Saleh Jerbo, and Bahar Idriss Abu Garda.43 The three were
accused of having committed war crimes during an attack carried out
against the African Union Mission in Sudan. 44 No arrest warrant was issued as the PTC found that it was not necessary as these suspects were
all ready to voluntarily appear before the Court.45 On February 8, 2010,
PTC I decided not to confirm the charges against Abu Garda.46 While the
charges against Banda and Jerbo were confirmed on March 7, 2011,47 the
38. Prosecutor v. Harun, ICC-02/05-01/07-57, Decision Informing the United Nations Security Council About the Lack of Cooperation by the Republic of the Sudan (May 25, 2010).
39. Prosecutor v. Hussein, ICC-02/05-01/12-20, Decision on the Cooperation of the Republic
of Chad Regarding Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein’s Arrest and Surrender to the Court (Nov.
13, 2013) [hereinafter Decision on Chad’s Failure to Arrest and Surrender Hussein]; Prosecutor v.
Hussein, ICC-02/05-01/12-21, Decision on the Cooperation of the Central African Republic Regarding Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein’s Arrest and Surrender to the Court (Nov. 13, 2013)
[hereinafter Decision on CAR’s Failure to Arrest and Surrender Hussein].
40. Decision on Chad’s Failure to Arrest and Surrender Hussein, supra note 39, ¶ 17; Decision
on CAR’s Failure to Arrest and Surrender Hussein, supra note 39, ¶ 11.
41. Prosecutor v. Hussein, ICC-02/05-01/12-33, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for a
Finding on Non-Compliance Against the Republic of the Sudan ¶ 7 (June 26, 2015) [hereinafter
Decision on Sudan’s Failure to Arrest and Surrender Hussein].
42. Prosecutor v. Banda, , ICC-02/05-03/09-636-Red, Prosecution’s Request for a Finding of
Non-Compliance Against the Republic of the Sudan in the Case of The Prosecutor v Abdallah
Banda Abakaer Nourain Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute (Oct. 16, 2015).
43. Prosecutor v. Banda, ICC-02/05-03/09-2, Summons to Appear for Saleh Mohammed
Jerbo Jamus (Aug. 27, 2009); Prosecutor v. Banda, ICC-02/05-03/09-3, Summons to Appear for
Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain (Aug. 27, 2009); Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, ICC-02/05-02/09-2,
Summons to Appear for Bahr Idriss Abu Garda (May 7, 2009).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red, Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges, (Feb. 8, 2010).
47. Prosecutor v. Banda, ICC-02/05-03/09-121-Corr-Red, Corrigendum of the “Decision on
the Confirmation of Charges” (Mar. 8, 2011).
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proceedings against Jerbo were later terminated as he was declared
dead.48
Nonetheless, Banda still asserted his willingness to appear before
the Court. However, in September 2014, it was found that, without the
cooperation of Sudan in facilitating Banda’s presence at trial, including
providing him with travel documents and making all other necessary arrangements as may be appropriate, an arrest warrant would need to be
issued.49 On November 19, 2015, Trial Chamber IV found that Sudan
failed to arrest and surrender Banda to the Court and, thus, issued a finding of non-compliance to be referred to the SC.50 When the ICC registry
attempted to send the request to arrest and surrender Banda, the Sudanese
Embassy refused receipt of the notes verbales.51
The PTC has stressed several times that, because the situation in
Darfur was triggered by the SC acting under Chapter VII, it constituted a
threat to international peace and security. 52 Thus, according to the PTC,
the SC was expected to assume its primary responsibility of restoring international peace and security by taking further action to enforce cooperation.53 Indeed, “[i]n the absence of follow-up actions on the part of the
Security Council any referral to the Court under Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter would become futile and incapable of achieving its ultimate goal of putting an end to impunity.” 54 In Decision on South Africa’s
Non-Compliance, the PTC believed that it was unnecessary to refer South
Africa to the SC, as all previous referrals “have not resulted in measures
against State Parties that have failed to comply with their obligations to
cooperate with the Court.”55 Despite some proposals, in particular those

48. Prosecutor v. Banda, ICC-02/05-03/09-512-Red, Public Redacted Decision Terminating
the Proceedings Against Mr. Jerbo (Oct. 4, 2013).
49. Prosecutor v. Banda, ICC-02/05-03/09, Warrant of Arrest for Abdallah Banda Abakaer
Nourain (Sept. 11, 2014).
50. Prosecutor v. Banda, ICC-02/05-03/09-641, Decision on the Prosecution’s Request for a
Finding of Non-Compliance (Nov. 19, 2015).
51. Id. ¶ 3. Similarly, the note verbale transmitting the “Decision informing the United Nations Security Council about the Lack of Cooperation by the Republic of Sudan” regarding Sudan’s
failure to surrender Hussein to the Sudanese authorities were left on the pavement before the Embassy of Sudan as the Ambassador refused to accept the notification and voiced his disapproval of
the Court. See Prosecutor v. Harun, ICC-02/05-01/07-62, Report of the Registrar on the Notification of the Decision Informing the United Nations Security Council About the Lack of Cooperation
by the Republic of Sudan to the Sudanese Authorities, ¶ 3, (July 26, 2010).
52. Prosecutor v. Harun, ICC-02/05-01/07-62, Report of the Registrar on the Notification of
the Decision Informing the United Nations Security Council About the Lack of Cooperation by the
Republic of Sudan to the Sudanese Authorities, ¶ 3, (July 26, 2010).
53. Decision on Sudan’s Failure to Arrest and Surrender Hussein, supra note 41, ¶ 8.
54. Decision on Uganda’s Non-Compliance, supra note 32, ¶ 16.
55. Decision on South Africa’s Non-Compliance, supra note 32, ¶ 138.
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from New Zealand, to adopt a structured practice on the SC’s handling of
non-cooperation referrals, no follow up has taken place to date.56
B. Libya
In February 2011, during the so-called “Arab Spring,” the SC referred the situation in Libya to the ICC through Resolution 1970.57 This
was the first and only SC referral to be adopted unanimously. 58 Even the
Organizations of the Islamic Conference, the Arab League, and the African Union appealed for intervention.59 A month later, the SC authorized
NATO to enforce a “No-fly Zone” over Libya.60 By that time, the situation spiraled into an armed conflict.
Less than six months after the SC referral, the ICC had already
charged Muammar Gaddafi, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, and Abdulla Al-Senussi with crimes against humanity.61 While these arrest warrants were
the quickest ever issued by ICC, the AU changed its position with regards
to the appropriateness of referring the situation in Libya to the ICC. 62 Indeed, the AU noted that “the warrant of arrest issued by the Pre-Trial
Chamber concerning Colonel Qadhafi, seriously complicates the efforts
aimed at finding a negotiated political solution to the crisis.”63
On October 20, 2011, after the AU decided that its Member States
shall not cooperate in the execution of the arrest warrant against Muammar Gaddafi and, subsequently, requested the SC to defer the ICC process
in Libya,64 Gaddafi was killed by a group of rebel fighters.65 A month
later, Gaddafi’s son, Saif, was captured trying to flee to Niger, and taken
to Zintan, a city in northwest Libya, where he remained in the custody of

56. S.C. 7582nd mtg., Doc. S/PV.7582 (Dec. 15, 2015).
57. S.C. Res. 1970, ¶ 6 (Feb. 26, 2011).
58. MARK KERSTEN, JUSTICE IN CONFLICT: THE EFFECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT’S INTERVENTIONS ON ENDING WARS AND BUILDING PEACE 116 (2016).
59. Id.
60. S.C. Res. 1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
61. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11-1, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and
Abdullah Alsenussi (June 27, 2011).
62. Id.
63. Assembly of the African Union, 17th Sess., ¶ 6, Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.366(XVII),
(June 30, 2011 - July 1, 2011).
64. Id; see also Anna Bishop, Failure of Complementarity: The Future of the International
Criminal Court Following the Libyan Admissibility Challenge, 22 MINN. J. OF INT’L L. 388, 402
(2013).
65. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi , ICC-01/11-01/11-22, Transmission of Muammar Mohammed Abu
Minyar Gaddafi’s Death Certificate (Nov. 9, 2011).
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the Zintan Brigade.66 On March 7, 2012, the first of several requests by
the new Libyan authorities to postpone the surrender of Saif Gaddafi to
the Court was rejected.67 The Chamber affirmed that Article 94(1) of the
Rome Statute, which relates to surrenders requests, did not mention any
possibility of postponement.68 A month later, the second Libyan postponement request was rejected on the grounds that there was no admissibility challenge before the Chamber at that time.69 The Chamber also reiterated its request that Libya proceed immediately with the surrender.
However, to abide by the request was, in practice, impossible as Gaddafi
was in custody of the Zintan Brigade, an autonomous group acting independently of the government.70
The Zintan Brigade also became responsible for another breach of
Libya’s obligation to the Court. When the ICC Office of the Public Counsel for the Defence visited Gaddafi in Zitan’s prison, they were detained
for almost a month and their documents were seized.71 The Pre-Trial
Chamber, recognizing the inviolability of the seized documents, requested their return to Gaddafi’s defence and the destruction of the copies; a request with which Libya would never abide.72
In March 2012, Abdullah Al-Senussi was arrested in Mauritania, a
State not party to the Rome Statute.73 After being approached by the ICC,
France and Libya, the Mauritanian authorities decided to extradite AlSenussi to Libya some six months later.74 On April 30, 2012, Libya challenged the admissibility of the Gaddafi and Al-Senussi case and requested
the postponement of the surrender requests.75 In particular, Libya argued
that it was vigorously investigating and willing to prosecute the accused

66. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11, Decision on the Non-Compliance by Libya with
Requests for Cooperation by the Court and Referring the Matter to the United Nations Security
Council, ¶ 7, (Dec. 10, 2014).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-0l/l l-0l/l 1-100, Decision Regarding the Second Request by
the Government of Libya for Postponement of the Surrender of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Apr. 4,
2012).
70. Libya: Surrender Saif al-Islam Gaddafi to ICC¸ HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (June 15, 2017),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/15/libya-surrender-saif-al-islam-gaddafi-icc; see also LIBYA:
FROM REPRESSION TO REVOLUTION 698 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2013).
71. See Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11, Decision on the Non-Compliance by Libya
with Requests for Cooperation by the Court and Referring the Matter to the United Nations Security
Council, ¶ 13 (Dec. 10, 2014) [hereinafter Decision on Libya’s Non-Compliance].
72. See id. ¶¶ 13-19.
73. Bishop, supra note 64, at 404.
74. Id. at 404-405.
75. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11-130-Red, Application on behalf of the Government of Libya Pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute (Apr. 30, 2012).
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and that under the principle of complementarity, the Court had an obligation to grant Libya’s admissibility challenge. 76 The Pre-Trial Chamber
redirected the challenge as only applicable to Gaddafi.77 On June 1, 2012,
the Pre-Trial Chamber granted the postponement of Gaddafi’s surrender
to the Court, pending the admissibility challenge.78
On December 10, 2012, PTC I issued an order to the Libyan authorities that “[r]eiterate[d] to the Libyan authorities the request for arrest and
surrender of Al-Senussi and remind[ed] them of their obligation to comply with the request.”79 On February 6, 2013, the Chamber issued a decision requesting Libya’s cooperation in the arrangement of a privileged
visit to Al-Senussi by his defence and ordering the immediate surrender
of Al-Senussi to the Court.80 Meanwhile, the admissibility challenge for
Al-Senussi was initiated on April 2, 2013, almost a year after the Gaddafi
case.81 For the only time in the history of the ICC, the OTP supported the
admissibility challenges, believing that Libya was genuine in its investigation and prosecution of the ICC accused.82 On the other hand, the defendants opposed it, preferring rather to be judged in The Hague.83 However, on June 14, 2013, the Pre-Trial Chamber ended Al-Senussi’s hopes
of a potential transfer to the ICC, as the surrender request was suspended
pending determination of the Libyan admissibility challenge.84

76. Id. ¶ 1.
77. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11-134, Decision on the Conduct of the Proceedings
Following the Application on behalf of the Government of Libya Pursuant to Article 19 of the
Statute, ¶ 8 (May 4, 2012); Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11-130-Red, ¶ 73 (Apr. 30, 2012).
78. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11-163, Decision on the Postponement of the Execution of the Request for Surrender of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi Pursuant to Article 95 of the Rome
Statute (June 1, 2012) (stating the request was postponed in conformity with article 95 of the Statute).
79. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11-241, Order in Relation to the Request for Arrest
and Surrender of Abdullah Al-Senussi, ¶ 10 (Dec. 10, 2013).
80. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11-269, Decision on the Urgent Application on Behalf of Abdullah Al-Senussi for Pre-Trial Chamber to Order the Libyan Authorities to Comply with
their Obligations and the Orders of the ICC (Feb. 6, 2013).
81. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11-307-Red2, Application on Behalf of the Government of Libya Relating to Abdullah Al-Senussi pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute (Apr. 2,
2013); see also Payam Akhavan, Complementarity Conundrums: The ICC Clock in Transitional
Times, 14 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1043, 1052 (2016) (explaining how the different timing affected the
outcome of the challenges) [hereinafter Complementarity Conundrums.]
82. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi , ICC-01/11-01/11-167-Red, Prosecution Response to Application
on Behalf of the Government of Libya pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute (June 5, 2012).
83. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11-354, Decision on Libya’s Postponement of the
Execution of the Request for Arrest and Surrender of Abdullah Al-Senussi Pursuant to Article 95
of the Rome Statute and Related Defence Request to Refer Libya to the UN Security Council ¶ 9
(June 14, 2013).
84. Id. ¶ 39.
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The first decision on the Libyan admissibility challenges was issued
with regards to Gaddafi on May 31, 2013.85 In considering whether a case
is inadmissible, the initial questions the Court determines are whether
there are past or ongoing investigations or prosecutions against the person
concerned for the same conduct as before the ICC.86 Once these questions
have been answered positively, the Court must examine the question of
unwillingness and inability.87 Libya provided documents demonstrating
its ongoing investigation of Gaddafi, which covered crimes that were arguably broader than the ones contained in the ICC arrest warrant.88 However, the Court stated that it was not persuaded that the evidence sufficiently demonstrated that the same case before the Court was also the
same case being investigated by Libya. 89 Having found the case against
Gaddafi to be admissible, the Pre-Trial Chamber recalled Libya’s obligation to surrender him to the ICC.90 A week later, the Libyan government
appealed the admissibility decision and requested that the order for the
surrender of Gaddafi be suspended pending the appeal judgment.91 The
Appeals Chamber rejected the request for suspensive effect, as it deemed
that Libya could continue its investigations irrespective of whether Gaddafi was transferred to The Hague.92
Meanwhile, the Pre-Trial Chamber issued its decision on the admissibility of the case against Al-Senussi.93 In contrast with Gaddafi, Al-Senussi was held in a state prison.94 While the PTC considered whether the
proceedings in Libya were covering the same case as before the Court, it
expressed some reservations concerning the fact that Al-Senussi was not
85. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11-344-Red, Public Redacted Decision on the Admissibility of the Case Against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, ¶ 219 (May 31, 2013).
86. Id. ¶ 58.
87. Alexandre Skander Galand, Security Council Referrals to the International Criminal
Court as Quasi-Legislative Acts, 19 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 142, 159 (2016).
88. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11-344-Red, ¶¶ 131-35.
89. Id. ¶ 219.
90. Id.
91. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11-350, The Government of Libya’s Appeal against
Pre-Trial Chamber I’s “Decision on the Admissibility of the Case Against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi”
(June 7, 2013).
92. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11-387, Decision on the Request for Suspensive Effect and Related issues, Appeals Chamber, ¶¶ 23-26 (July 18, 2013).
93. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11-466-Red, Decision on the Admissibility of the
Case Against Abdullah Al-Senussi (Oct. 11, 2013) (explaining that the Chamber considered that
this could render Libya unable to carry out judicial proceedings against Al Senussi as according to
the Libyan national justice system, trial proceedings cannot be conducted in the absence of a lawyer
for the suspect).
94. Id. ¶ 308. However, this fact should not affect the first limb of the inadmissibility test,
namely, whether the case at the national level covers the same conduct as the proceedings before
the ICC. See Complementarity Conundrums, supra note 81, at 1054.
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provided any form of legal representation for his trial at the domestic
level.95 Nevertheless, the Libyan inadmissibility challenge became the
first decision of the Court ruling in favor of a trial at the domestic level.96
Al-Senussi appealed the decision.97
While awaiting the appeals on both of the admissibility challenges,
Gaddafi’s defence lodged a further request for finding of non-compliance
and referral to the Security Council.98 The Libyan government objected
that Gaddafi’s non-surrender was not in bad faith and that they were negotiating with the Zintan Brigade for his transfer, without specifying
whether this would be to The Hague or Tripoli.99
While the Chamber did not seize the requests for a finding of noncompliance, the defence sought a leave to appeal the Pre-Trial Chamber’s
failure to issue a decision. The Pre-Trial Chamber rejected the defence
application.100 Around a year later, as objective compliance with the
Court’s request was not forthcoming, PTC I finally requested:
Libya to inform the Chamber, by Wednesday, 28 May 2014, as to the
status of the implementation of: (i) its duty to immediately surrender
Mr Gaddafi to the Court; (ii) its duty to return to the Defence of Mr
Gaddafi the originals of the materials that were seized from the former
Defence counsel for Mr Gaddafi by the Libyan authorities during her
visit to Mr Gaddafi in Zintan, and destroy any copies thereof; and (iii)
its duty to arrange a privileged legal visit to Mr Al-Senussi by his Defence.101

The possibility that the Chamber would refer Libya’s failure to cooperate to the Security Council was indeed becoming more concrete.
On July 24, 2014, the Appeals Chamber dismissed the appeal
brought by Al-Senussi and confirmed the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision

95. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11-466-Red, ¶¶ 305-08.
96. Complementarity Conundrums, supra note 81, at 1055.
97. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11 OA6, Scheduling Order for the Judgment on the
Defence’s Appeal Against the “Decision on the Admissibility of the Case Against Abdullah AlSenussi” (July 22, 2014).
98. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11-388, Request for Finding of Non-Compliance
and Referral to United Nations Security Council (July 23, 2013).
99. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11-402, Response to the Gaddafi Defence’s Request
for Finding of Non-Compliance and Referral to United Nations Security Council, ¶¶ 12-13 (Aug.
14, 2013).
100. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11-556, Decision on the “Request for Leave to Appeal the Pre-Trial Chamber’s Failure to Issue a Decision” filed by the Defence of Saif Al-Islam
Gaddafi (June 10, 2014).
101. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11-545, Decision Requesting Libya to Provide Submissions on the Status of the Implementation of its Outstanding Duties to Cooperate with the Court
(May 15, 2014).
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to leave his case to be tried by the Libyan domestic court.102 The requests
for cooperation in relation to the case against Al-Senussi were thus withdrawn.103 Conversely, the Appeals Chamber had confirmed that the Gaddafi case was admissible to the Court.104 However, Gaddafi’s surrender,
as well as the surrender of the privileged documents seized from his defense, did not soon follow.105
Thus, on December 10, 2014, the Pre-Trial Chamber decided to
tackle outright the outstanding issues for which Libya failed to cooperate.106 The Chamber indicated that the power to refer the matter to the
Security Council, according to Article 87(7) was discretionary in nature.107 Prior to determining the appropriateness and usefulness of referring the matter to the SC, two conditions were spelled out by the Chamber. First, there must have been an objective failure to comply.108 Second,
the requested State must have had the chance to explain itself. 109 In this
case, both conditions were deemed met. Despite recognizing “the genuine
efforts made by Libya to maintain a constructive dialogue with the Court
and . . . the difficulties in its territory,” the Chamber considered it appropriate to make a finding of non-compliance and refer the matter to the
SC.110 In the Chamber’s view, the referral was not designed as a sanction,
but as a tool to seek assistance from the SC on how to eliminate impediments to cooperation.111
While no further non-compliance decision has been issued in the
Libyan situation, the fate of Gaddafi still remains nebulous. On July 28,
2015, the Tripoli Court of Appeal sentenced Gaddafi to death along with
several other co-accused, including Al-Senussi for their roles during
Libya’s 2011 uprising.112 The OTP filed a request to the Court to order

102. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11-565, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Abdullah
Al-Senussi against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 11 October 2013 Entitled “Decision on
admissibility of the case against Abdullah Al-Senussi” (July 24, 2014).
103. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11-567, Decision Following the Declaration of Inadmissibility of the Case against Abdullah Al-Senussi before the Court (Aug. 7, 2014).
104. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11-344-Red, ¶ 219.
105. Decision on Libya’s Non-Compliance, supra note 71, ¶ 25.
106. Id.
107. Id. ¶ 23.
108. Id. ¶ 24.
109. Id.
110. Id. ¶ 33.
111. Id. ¶¶ 33-34.
112. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi and Al-Senussi, ICC-01/11-01/11-612, Response to Prosecution’s
“Request for an Order to Libya to Refrain from Executing Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, Immediately
Surrender Him to the Court, and Report His Death Sentence to the United Nations Security Council,” ¶1 (Aug. 20, 2015).
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Libya to refrain from executing Gaddafi.113 For the first time in Gaddafi’s
case, the purported request did not concern acts of the Zintan Brigade,
but those of the Libyan authorities.114 The State representative retorted
that as the trial was in absentia – although Gaddafi attended two trial sessions via video link,115 Gaddafi would have, once (and if) he were transferred from Zintan, the right to a new trial in person.116 As of yet, no decision has been made on this issue. Conversely, the OTP requested the
PTC to bypass the government of Libya and directly transmit the request
for surrender to the commander of the Zintan Brigade.117 Whereas the
Libyan authorities did not allow for this channel of communication, the
Chamber rejected to direct its cooperation request to an entity that is not
the de jure government.118 In June 2017, the OTP acknowledged that
some media reported that the Zintan Brigade had released Saif Gaddafi
and that it was trying to find his whereabouts.119
The OTP recently announced that a further arrest warrant for one of
Gaddafi’s allies, Al-Tuhamy Mohamed Khaled had been issued under
seal on April 18, 2013.120 Al-Tuhamy was apparently residing in Egypt
– a State not party to the Rome Statute – but was not arrested and surrendered on the pretense that other criminals should be sought by the
Court.121 On April 24, 2017, the ICC issued an arrest warrant against AlWerfalli for war crimes committed in 2016-2017; the first warrant in the

113. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11-611, Prosecution Request for an Order to Libya
to Refrain from Executing Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, Immediately Surrender Him to the Court, and
Report His Death Sentence to the United Nations Security Council (July 30, 2015).
114. Id.
115. Nidal Nabil Jurdi, The Complementarity Regime of the International Criminal Court in
Practice: Is It Truly Serving the Purpose? Some Lessons from Libya, 30 LEID JOUR. INT’L L. 199,
211 (2017).
116. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11-612, Response to Prosecution’s “Request for an
Order to Libya to Refrain from Executing Saif Al Islam Gaddafi, States Representatives, Immediately Surrender Him to the Court, and Report His Death Sentence to the United Nations Security
Council” (Aug. 20, 2015).
117. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11-634-Red, Decision on the Prosecutor’s “Request
for an order directing the Registrar to transmit the request for arrest and surrender to Mr al-’Ajami
AL-’ATIRI, Commander of the Abu-Bakr Al Siddiq Battalion in Zintan, Libya,” ¶¶ 15-16 (Nov.
21, 2016).
118. Id.
119. ICC Prosecutor Calls for the Immediate Arrest and Surrender of the Suspects, Mssrs Saif
Al-Islam Gaddafi and Al-Tuhamy Mohamed Khaled to the Court, THE INT’L CRIMINAL COURT
(June 14, 2017), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=170614-OTP-stat.
120. See S.C. 7934th mtg. ¶5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7934 (May 8, 2017).
121. Id.; Prosecutor v Al Tuhamy Mohamed Khaled, ICC-01/11-01/13, Warrant of Arrest for
Al-Tuhamy Mohamed Khaled with under seal and ex parte Annex (Apr. 18, 2013).
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Libyan situation that did not concern a former official of the Gaddafi regime.122
C. Kenya
The ICC intervention in Kenya was preceded at the national level
by a few cases before Kenyan courts restricted to low-level perpetrators
on charges limited to simple offences and the Waki Commission. The
Waki Commission recommended that a hybrid Special Tribunal of domestic and international judges be set up to try high-level perpetrators of
crimes committed during the 2007-2008 post-election violence.123 One
year after the request, no hybrid special tribunal was set up; thus, the OTP
asked the Pre-Trial Chamber for the authorization to open an investigation in Kenya.124 The Pre-Trial Chamber granted the OTP’s request, with
one dissenting opinion from Judge Kaul, arguing that the Court lacked
jurisdiction, as the crimes committed in Kenya did not satisfy the threshold to be considered as crimes against humanity.125
In March 2011, less than a year after having authorized the investigation, PTC II summoned six accused: William Samoei Ruto (minister of
higher education, science, and technology), Henry Kiprono Kosgey
(member of parliament), Joshua Arap Sang (head of operations of a radio
station, Kass FM, allegedly affiliated with one of the two political
camps),126 Francis Kirimi Muthaura (head of the public service and secretary to the cabinet), Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta (deputy prime minister and
minister of finance) and Mohammed Hussein Ali (chief executive and
head of the national postal corporation and former chief of police) to appear before the Court, who became colloquially known as the Ocampo
Six.127

122. Case Information Sheet, Situation in Libya, ICC-01/11-01/17, ICC (Aug. 15, 2017), https:
//www.icc-cpi.int/libya/al-werfalli/Documents/al-werfalliEng.pdf.
123. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the
Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya,
¶ 183 (March 31, 2010) [hereinafter Decision on the Authorization of an Investigation in Kenya].
124. Id. ¶ 28.
125. Id. ¶ 72.
126. Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11-307, Judgment on the appeal of the Republic of
Kenya against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled “Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute,” ¶ 2 (Aug. 30, 2011); Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11-1, Decision
on the Prosecutor’s Application for Summons to Appear for William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono
Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, ¶ 72 (Mar. 8, 2011).
127. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11-1, ¶ 65; Prosecutor v. Muthaura, ICC-01/09-02/11-1, Decision on
the Prosecutor’s Application for Summonses to Appear for Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai
Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali (Mar. 8, 2011).

TECH TO EIC (DO NOT DELETE)

142

5/14/2018 7:39 AM

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 41:2

On the one hand, all the accused accepted to appear voluntarily before the Court; on the other hand, the Kenyan government immediately
challenged the admissibility of the cases.128 It argued that it was in a process of a comprehensive judicial reform and that it was preparing to investigate the same conduct as the ones investigated by the OTP.129 Despite this pledge from the Kenyan authorities, the Pre-Trial Chamber and
the Appeals Chamber confirmed that the cases were admissible, as there
was no credible information suggesting that the conduct and the suspects
were being investigated.130
At the confirmation proceedings, the charges were confirmed
against four of the six suspects, including now-President Kenyatta and
now-Deputy President Ruto (who assumed their posts in March 2013).131
In March 2013, well over a year after the confirmation proceedings, the
charges against Francis Muthaura were dropped.132 While the trial continued for the other accused suspects, the Government of Kenya started to
rally at the AU for a mass withdrawal from the ICC, immunity for serving
African heads of States, and to have the Kenyan proceedings deferred by
the Security Council.133 Also, though not formally challenging Article 27
of the Rome Statute on the irrelevance of official positions before the
Court, Kenyatta and Ruto requested to be excused from trial on the
ground of their high-ranking positions and accompanying responsibilities.134 The Kenyan government then approached the ASP with a request

128. Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11-19, Application on Behalf of the Government of The
Republic of Kenya Pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute (Mar. 31, 2011).
129. Prosecutor v. Muthaura, ICC-01/09-02/11-96, Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the
Statute, ¶¶12-14 (May 30, 2011).
130. Id.; Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11-101, Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the
Statute (May 30, 2011); Prosecutor v. Muthaura, ICC-01/09-02/11-274, Judgment on the Appeal
of the Republic of Kenya against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 Entitled
“Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the
Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute” (Aug. 30, 2011); Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11-307.
131. Prosecutor v. Muthaura, ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red, Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute (Jan. 26, 2012).
132. Prosecutor v. Muthaura, ICC-01/09-02/11-687, Prosecution Notification of Withdrawal
of the Charges against Francis Kirimi Muthaura (Mar. 11, 2013).
133. Assembly of the African Union, Decision on International Jurisdiction and the International Criminal Court, Doc. AU Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.482(XXI) (May 26-27, 2013); Assembly
of the African Union, 15th Sess., Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the International Criminal
Court (ICC) (Oct. 12, 2013); S.C. 7060th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.7060 (Nov. 15, 2013).
134. This was first suggested by the defense of Mr. Ruto. Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11777, Decision on Mr. Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial, ¶ 1 (June 18,
2013); Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/II-830, Decision on Defence Request for Conditional
Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial, ¶¶ 5, 66-67 (Oct. 18 2013); Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-
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for amending Article 27 of the Rome Statute or the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence concerning the accused’s presence at trial.135
Around the same time the ICC was hearing the excusal requests of
Kenyatta and Ruto, the ICC issued an arrest warrant against Walter Barasa for trying to bribe witnesses in the Ruto case.136 Additionally, while
the ASP was considering Kenya’s amendments, the OTP filed an application against the Government of Kenya for a finding of non-cooperation
with regards to failure to provide documentary evidence related to the
Kenyatta case.137 The Pre-Trial Chamber found that the Kenyan government failed to obtain the requested material and that its approach “f[ell]
short of the standard of good faith cooperation,” which entailed that its
“failure ha[d] reached the threshold of non-compliance required under
Article 87(7) of the Statute.”138 The Pre-Trial Chamber also found that the
Kenyan Government’s non-compliance had affected the exercise of the
Court’s functions and powers under the Statute,139 but declined to refer
the matter, as it believed that the possibility of obtaining the evidence was
speculative.140
A year later, while the Trial Chamber’s decision not to refer Kenya
to the ASP despite its failure to cooperate was under appeal, the OTP
dropped all charges against Kenyatta owing to a lack of evidence against
him.141 This meant that proceedings continued for only two of the original
Ocampo Six accused: Joshua Sang and Deputy President Ruto.
In March 2015, the ICC issued two more arrest warrants against
Paul Gicheru and Philip Kipkoech Bett for the crime of corruptly influencing six witnesses for their withdrawal as prosecution witnesses or their
01/09-01/11-1066, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor against the Decision of Trial Chamber V(a) of 18 June 2013 Entitled “Decision on Mr Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous
Presence at Trial,” ¶ 6 (Oct. 25, 2013).
135. Rules 134 bis, ter, and quater, were amended at the 2013 Annual Meeting of the Assembly
of States Party, see ICC Res. ICC-ASP/Iz/Res. 7, ¶ 134 (Nov. 27, 2013). Whereas Rule 134 bis
regards the use of video technology, Rules 134 ter and quater both regulate situations where complete absence, including virtual participation, from trial can be excused. See Johanna Gohler, Busy
Defendants and Phantom Trials: Rethinking the Defendant’s Attendance Requirements before the
ICC, 18 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 473, 497 (2016).
136. Prosecutor v. Barasa, ICC-01/09-01/13-1-Red2, Warrant of Arrest for Walter Osapiri Barasa (Aug. 2, 2013).
137. Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, ICC-O 1/09-02/1 1-866-Conf-Exp, Prosecution Application for a
Finding of Non-Compliance pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Statute against the Government of
Kenya (Nov. 28, 2013).
138. Prosecutor v. Kenyatta , ICC-01/09-02/11-982, Decision on Prosecution’s Application for
a Finding of Non-Compliance under Article 87(7) of the Statute, ¶ 78 (Dec. 3, 2014).
139. Id. ¶ 79.
140. Id. ¶ 78.
141. Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11-1005, Decision on the Withdrawal of Charges
against Mr. Kenyatta (Mar. 13, 2015).
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recant of prior statements to the Prosecutor.142 A month later, the Prosecutor requested that the Trial Chamber in the Ruto case admit prior recorded testimony from witnesses who had recanted their prior statements.143 Before the Appeals Chamber could state whether the Trial
Chamber’s decision partly granting the Prosecutor’s decision should be
reversed, the Kenyan government unsuccessfully tried to convince the
2015 Annual meeting of the ASP to ensure that Rule 68, on the admission
of prior recorded testimony, would not be applied to Ruto’s case.144
On April 5, 2016, the last two accused of the Ocampo Six won their
“no case to answer” motion and proceedings were terminated.145 According to the Chamber’s majority, this decision does not preclude new prosecution in the future either at the ICC or in a national jurisdiction.146 Indeed, Judge Eboe-Osuji appended a concurring opinion in which he
declared a mistrial in the case.147 According to the Judge, it could not be
discounted that the weaknesses in the Prosecution case might be explained by the demonstrated incidences of tainting of the trial process by
way of witness interference and political meddling that was reasonably
likely to intimidate witnesses.148 Similarly, since the cases against
Muthaura and Kenyatta were closed due to the withdrawal of charges,
they can be reopened if the Prosecutor submits new evidence.149
Finally, on September 19, 2016, Trial Chamber V(B) came back to
its finding of non-compliance in the Kenyatta case and referred the matter
to the Assembly of States Parties.150 The Trial Chamber considered that
taking into account the deadlock reached, only the ASP could take effective actions in order to provide an incentive for Kenya to cooperate with

142. Prosecutor v. Gicheru, ICC-01/09-01/15-1-Red, Decision on the “Prosecution’s Application under Article 58(1) of the Rome Statute” (Sept. 10, 2015).
143. Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11-1866-Conf, Prosecutor’s Request to Admit Prior
Recorded Testimony into Evidence (Apr. 29, 2015); Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11-1938Conf-Corr, Decision on Prosecution Request for Admission of Prior Recorded Testimony (Aug.
28, 2015) (granting request for admission or prior recorded testimony in part).
144. See generally Kenya: State Parties Run Dangerously Close to Interfering with the ICC’s
Independence, AMNESTY INT’L (Nov. 27, 2015, 3:46 PM), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/
news/2015/11/kenya-state-parties-run-dangerously-close-to-interfering-with-the-iccs-independence/.
145. Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11-2027-Red-Corr, Decision on Defence Applications
for Judgments of Acquittal (June 16, 2016).
146. Id. ¶ 148, n. 210.
147. Id. ¶ 140.
148. Id. ¶¶ 141-42.
149. Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11-1005, ¶4.
150. Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11, Second Decision on Prosecution’s Application
for a Finding of Non-Compliance under Article 87(7) of the Statute, ¶¶ 37-38 (Sept. 19, 2016).
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the Court, in relation to both the requested material specifically and more
generally.151
As to the pending arrest warrants against Barasa, Gicheru and Kipkoech, Kenyan officials have indicated their unwillingness to hand them
over to the ICC claiming that they have their own courts.152
II. LEGITIMACY GROUNDS
One of the main assumptions of this article, which is mostly upheld
in the sociological literature, is that compliance with the Court’s requests
is taken as an indicator of whether it is seen as legitimate.153 Compliance
is indeed associated with social legitimacy as the former signals whether
the State believes that the institution has the right to rule. 154 Certainly,
legitimacy’s relationship with compliance is circular.155 According to
Franck, objective legitimacy would exert a “compliance pull.”156 And
compliance, in turn, would provide legitimacy to international norms and
courts.157
The purpose of this study is not to classify the ICC as illegitimate
because of failures to comply. Rather, it is to see which legitimacy
grounds were at stake in these situations where States failed to comply
with the Court’s order.158 In other words, justifications for non-compliance provide social legitimacy feedback on normative legitimacy
grounds.159 Thus, this study focuses on the classical normative legitimacy
grounds: source, process, and outcome legitimacy. 160 Moreover, it adds

151. Id.
152. See Mark Kersten, Referring Kenya to the ICC Assembly of States Parties, Part 3: Implications for the Ongoing Kenya Cases at the ICC, JUST. IN CONFLICT (Oct. 6, 2016), https://justicein
conflict.org/2016/10/06/referring-kenya-to-the-icc-assembly-of-states-parties-part-3-implicationsfor-the-ongoing-kenya-cases-at-the-icc/.
153. See, e.g., Alexandra Huneeus, Compliance with Judgments and Decision, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 440-41 (Cesare P. R. Romano et al. eds., 2013).
154. See Allen Buchanan & Robert O. Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions, 20 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 405, 406 (2006).
155. See Robert O. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38
HARV. J. INT’L L. 487, 493 (1997).
156. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG Nations 26 (1990).
157. See id.; see also Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, International
Relations and Compliance, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 541 (Walter
Carlnaes et al. eds., 2002).
158. See generally Çalı et al., supra note 3, at 959-61.
159. See generally JUTTA BRUNNÉE & STEPHEN J TOOPE, LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AN INTERACTIONAL ACCOUNT (2010).
160. RÜDIGER WOLFRUM AND VOLKER RÖBEN, LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 6-7
(2008).
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to these normative (i.e., objective) legitimacy grounds the subjective perception of the non-complying States as to whether these grounds are justifying them for not cooperating with the ICC. As we will see in subsequent sections, the context of each situation influences the objective and
subjective legitimacy of the Court and their decisions.
A. Source Legitimacy
A widely adhered to view of public international lawyers is the correlation between the legitimacy of international law and courts with state
consent.161 This may be called the legitimacy of the source of the Court’s
jurisdiction or the constitutive dimension of the Court. As they were established without the consent of the concerned States,162 this was one of
the most vocal contentions about the legitimacy of the ad hoc tribunals
created by the Security Council to deal with the situations in the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.163
When examining source legitimacy, we must ascertain all links in
the “chain of delegation.”164 The links in the chain of delegation leading
to the issuance of an international court decision are as follows: “the international court itself, the mandate providers that established it, the individual states comprising the mandate providers, and the governments
of those states claiming to express the wishes of their respective populations.”165 Whether governments speak on behalf of their citizens is also
relevant to this inquiry. However, by taking compliance as a point of departure, the democratic consent to a State’s behaviour is assumed. Here,
we explore the various links in the chain of delegation from the non-complying State to the non-complied ICC request.
The ICC is the first treaty-based international criminal court; a feature that should provide it with high “legitimacy capital.”166 The Rome
Statute provides for three triggering mechanisms for the ICC to exercise
jurisdiction over a situation. The first is a state referral of a situation in
which a crime has been committed in the territory or by a national of a
State party.167 The second is where the Prosecutor initiates an investigation proprio motu over a situation where a crime has been committed by
161. Id.
162. S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993); S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
163. Alfred P. Rubin, An International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, 6 PACE
INT’L L. REV. 7 (1994).
164. YUVAL SHANY, ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 141-42
(2014).
165. Id. at 41.
166. Id. at 238.
167. Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 13 (a).

TECH TO EIC (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

5/14/2018 7:39 AM

Global Public Good Perspective on Criminal Courts

147

a national or in the territory of a State party. 168 The third is where the
Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, refers a
situation where a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC appears to have
been committed.169 When the SC refers a situation to the ICC, the requirement of nationality or territoriality do not apply. 170 In other words, SC
referrals provide the Court with a jurisdiction over the territory and nationals of States that have not ratified the Rome Statute, and therefore, do
not consent to the ICC’s exercise of jurisdiction. Obviously, the ICC has
higher source legitimacy over its States Parties than over non-States Parties.
The situations in Darfur and Libya were both triggered by a SC referral. Sudan signed the Rome Statute, but never ratified it, 171 while Libya
neither signed nor ratified the Rome Statute.172 Thus, Sudan and Libya
are clear examples of States not party to the Rome Statute, but still subject
to the ICC’s jurisdiction. Both SC referrals explicitly required that the
authorities of the referred States “cooperate fully with and provide any
necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution.”173 The SC referrals to the ICC are adopted under Chapter VII of
the United Nations (UN) Charter.174 The obligation of the referred State
to accept the jurisdiction of the Court over its territory and nationals, despite the lack of explicit consent, derives from the Chapter VII nature of
the SC referral.175 Likewise, the obligation to comply with ICC requests
emanates from the Chapter VII powers of the SC resolution obliging it to
cooperate with the Court.176 By being members of the UN Charter, Sudan
and Libya have tacitly agreed that such obligations might emerge from

168. Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 13 (c).
169. Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 13 (b).
170. Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 13.
171. During the Rome Conference, Sudan abstained from voting in favor of the Statute’s adoption out of disagreement over the Court’s jurisdiction over war crimes in international armed conflicts, SC referrals and the prohibition on reservations. See SARAH M. H. NOUWEN,
COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE LINE OF FIRE: THE CATALYSING EFFECT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT IN UGANDA AND SUDAN 247, 248 (2013).
172. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LIBYA AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1 (2013).
173. Nerina Boschiero, The ICC Judicial Finding on Non-Cooperation Against the DRC and
No Immunity for Al-Bashir Based on UNSC Resolution 1593 13 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 625, 646
(2015). SC Resolution 1593 also makes this obligation incumbent upon “all other parties to the
conflict in Darfur,” id.
174. U.N. Charter, ch. VII.
175. U.N. Charter, art. 25 (providing that members of the UN are obliged to accept and carry
out the decisions of the SC to refer the situation to the ICC.) The clause within the SC resolution
requesting full cooperation is also binding on the State targeted, id.
176. Id.

TECH TO EIC (DO NOT DELETE)

148

5/14/2018 7:39 AM

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 41:2

SC Chapter VII measures. This is as far as the objective version of the
source legitimacy of the ICC jurisdiction over Libya and Sudan goes.
From the perspective of the concerned State, the view on whether
the source legitimacy of the ICC is grounded may differ. During the SC
meeting where Resolution 1593 was adopted, Sudan objected that “Sudan
. . . is not party to the ICC. This makes the implementation of a resolution
like this fraught.”177 In fact, Sudan never officially responded to the ICC’s
transmission of the arrest warrants against Al-Bashir; its embassy in The
Hague even refuses the delivery of documents coming from the Court.178
During a meeting held on December 11, 2013, Sudan’s Ambassador to
the UN asserted before the SC: “I should like to say, for the purposes of
the record of this meeting, that our participation today does not mean that
we recognize the International Criminal Court (ICC) or that we are going
to cooperate with it, since the Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute.” 179
Indeed, the official position of Sudan is “[f]or us, the ICC doesn’t exist.”180
The most striking point with regards to the non-compliance issue in
the situation of Darfur is that it concerns Sudan, as well as other States
party to the Rome Statute, which are predominantly AU Member States.
However, the case of intended non-compliance only concerns Al-Bashir.
As seen above, the State Parties that failed to arrest Hussein claimed that
if they knew of his arrival in their territory in due time they would have
arrested him. Thus, aside from Sudan, other States do not challenge the
source legitimacy of the Court’s jurisdiction in Darfur, but the source legitimacy of the ICC’s personal jurisdiction over Al-Bashir. State Parties
who were subject to referral proceedings under Article 87(7) of the Rome
Statute for having not arrested Al-Bashir have argued that Article 98(1)
of the Rome Statute precludes the Court from asking State Parties to arrest and surrender the head of a non-party State. 181 Since Al-Bashir is the
head of a State not party to the Rome Statute, the argument goes, he is
entitled under customary international law to immunity ratione personae,
which protects him from other States, as well as the ICC’s exercise of
177. S.C. 5158th mtg., at 13 U.N. Doc. S/PV.5158 (Mar. 31, 2005).
178. The Sudanese Embassy has always refused the delivery of letter form the ICC registry.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-237, Registrar’s Report on the Implementation
of the Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for a Finding of Non-Compliance Against the Republic
of the Sudan (Apr. 23, 2015).
179. S.C. 7080th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.7080 (Dec. 11, 2013).
180. Randy James, Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, TIME (Mar. 05, 2009), http://
content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1883213,00.html.
181. See, e.g., Decision on Djibouti’s Non-Compliance, supra note 32, ¶ 6; Decision on
Uganda’s Non-Compliance, supra note 32, ¶ 7.
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jurisdiction.182 This is indeed the view of the African Union, which decided that “its Member States shall not cooperate pursuant to the provisions of Article 98 of the Rome Statute of the ICC relating to immunities,
for the arrest and surrender of President Omar El Bashir of The Sudan.”183
To put it simply, as long as Sudan does not consent to the ICC’s exercise
of jurisdiction, and waives immunity, Sudan and other States where AlBashir has traveled will find a ground to argue that the ICC’s request for
arrest and surrender of Al-Bashir lacks source legitimacy.
Conversely, the current Libyan authorities accept the Court’s jurisdiction. On the same day as Resolution 1970 was voted on, Libyan diplomats at the United Nations mission in New York broke with Gadhafi’s
regime.184 In this dubious capacity, Libya’s UN representative stated before the Council: “I am pleased that the Security Council will refer this
matter to the International Criminal Court to investigate the crimes committed in Libya since 15 February.”185 Immediately after, the Gaddafi
Government wrote to the Secretary General declaring that the two diplomats could no longer represent Libya at the United Nations.186 Gaddafi’s
communication was abided with until September 16, 2011.187 The rebels
had then seized control over a large part of Libya. Shortly after, the new
Libyan authorities appointed an official to act as its representative before
the Court.188 In a letter dated November 23, 2011, the Libyan National
Transitional Council communicated to the ICC that it was committed to
cooperate with the Court, but that “the Libyan judiciary has primary jurisdiction to try Saif-al-Islam and that the Libyan State is willing and able
to try him in accordance with Libyan law.”189 Overall, despite the fact that
Libya is not a State party to the Rome Statute, the source legitimacy of
Libya’s obligation to abide by the ICC requests has not been challenged.
Indeed, the Libyan authorities appear to have engaged with the Court
without raising the point that they are not bound by the ICC’s statutory

182. See Comm’n of the African Union, Press Release No. 002/2012 (Jan. 8, 2012).
183. Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 26, ¶ 10.
184. Colin Moynihan, Libya’s U.N. Diplomats Break With Qaddafi, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/22/world/africa/22nations.html; see also ELIAV
LIEBLICH, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CIVIL WARS: INTERVENTION AND CONSENT 236 (2013).
185. S.C. 6491st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.6491, 7 (Feb. 26, 2011).
186. See LORAINE SIEVERS & SAM DAWS, THE PROCEDURE OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL
157 (2014).
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi et al., ICC-01/11-01/11-34-Anx, National Transition Council (Nov.
23, 2011).
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framework. With regards to its failure to comply with the Court’s requests, Libya has blamed the failure on Libya’s volatile security situation
currently prevailing in the country.190 For instance, in its last communication to the Court, Libya affirmed that “there are currently on-going negotiations to establish a unified Government which will in due course
facilitate the resumption of Libya’s full cooperation with the Court.”191
The Libyan situation shows that even if concerned with the territory and
nationals of States not parties to the Rome Statute, the ICC jurisdiction
over a situation triggered by SC referrals is not always contested for its
lack of source legitimacy. A new regime may actually welcome such referrals if the OTP only investigates and prosecutes crimes committed by
the regime in place at the time of the referrals. This consent may however
be disavowed if the OTP prosecutes all suspected perpetrators, including
members of the current regime.
Since Kenya is a State party to the Rome Statute, the source legitimacy of the situation in Kenya is harder to contest. Nonetheless, it may
be asserted that situations triggered by the Prosecutor, without the State’s
endorsement, are also subject to a certain source legitimacy issue. Proprio motu investigations are not at the initiative of States, but rather provided in the Rome Statute to ensure that the Court could act in situations
where, for political or other reasons, neither a State Party nor the Security
Council were able or willing to initiate proceedings.192 There have been
four situations where the prosecutor exercised its proprio motu power.193
The situation in Kenya was the first of such situations. During national
debates over the establishment of a special tribunal to counteract the ICC
under the complementarity principle, a member of parliament argued:
Kenya should manage its own affairs and take charge of its sovereignty. We cannot surrender or cede it to any nation or agency. We
must protect that treasured right . . . the moment we let people go to
The Hague, we will cede our sovereignty and capability to think as a

190. Decision on Libya’s Non-Compliance, supra note 32, ¶ 32.
191. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11-612, Response to Prosecution’s “Request for an
Order to Libya to Refrain from Executing Saif Al‑ Islam Gaddafi, Immediately Surrender Him to
the Court, and Report His Death Sentence to the United Nations Security Council,” ¶ 3 (Aug. 20,
2015).
192. Morten Bergsmo, Jelena Pejic & Dan Zhu, Article 15, in ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 727 (Otto Triffterer et al. eds., 2016).
193. See S.C. 7080th mtg., supra note 179. The Prosecutor has also been authorized to open a
situation proprio in Burundi on October 25, 2017.
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nation and as a society. We will forever be slaves to forces that are
larger than us.194

The Kenyan authorities were opposed to the Prosecutor’s opening
of investigation proprio motu. Still, they remained courteous with the
Court and on the surface appeared to collaborate with it.195 It is the summons issued against the Ocampo Six that prompted the Kenyan parliament to pass a motion calling upon the government to withdraw from the
Rome Statute.196 The motion was then followed by an unsuccessful admissibility challenge and a request to the SC for a deferral, under Article
16 of the Rome Statute, that never managed to attract a sufficient majority
of the SC’s members.197 In the courtroom, Kenyatta challenged the source
legitimacy of the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the situation in
Kenya by relying on the dissenting opinion of Judge Kaul. 198 However,
the Pre-Trial Chamber rejected this argument, and thus the Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae was firmly established.199 Kenya’s failure to submit the requested material in the Kenyatta case, which lead to the referral
under Article 87 to the ASP, was not contested for source legitimacy. 200
It was simply not abided by because Kenya had no interest in cooperating
with a Court that could put its head of State behind bars.201 Overall,
Kenya’s expressed intent to withdraw, as well as its appeal to the SC for
a deferral and its admissibility challenge show that fundamentally the accused, whom personified the State, opposed the ICC’s prosecution.202

194. LIONEL NICHOLS,
IN KENYA 143 (2015).

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE END OF IMPUNITY

195. See Courtney Hillebrecht & Scott Straus, Who Pursues the Perpetrators?: State Cooperation with the ICC, 39 HUM. R. QU’Y 162, 180 (2017).
196. A withdrawal would have taken out the source legitimacy of the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Kenya’s territory and nationals. However, note that the Court would retain jurisdiction
over conduct that occurred within the frame of the situation in Kenya. By the same token, Kenya
would still be obliged to cooperate with respect to its obligation emerging from this situation. See
Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 127; see also Michael Onyiego, Kenya’s Politicians Look to Withdraw from ICC as Suspects Named, VOA NEWS, (Dec. 15, 2010, 7:00 PM), https://www.voanews
.com/a/kenyas-politicians-look-to-withdraw-from-icc-as-suspects-named—
111998579/157058.html.
197. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11-19; Permanent Rep. of Kenya to the U.N., Identical letters dated
Oct. 21, 2013 from the Permanent Rep. of Kenya to the United Nations addressed to the SecretaryGeneral and the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2013/624 (Oct. 22, 2013).
198. Prosecutor v. Muthaura, ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red, Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute (Jan. 26, 2012).
199. See id.
200. Prosecutor v. Muthaura, ICC-01/09-02/11-687, Prosecution Notification of Withdrawal
of the Charges against Francis Kirimi Muthaura (Mar. 11, 2013).
201. Id.
202. Id.
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To sum up, in these three situations where non-compliance has been
adjudicated, the Court’s jurisdiction has been seized by another actor
other than the concerned authorities. The exercise of jurisdiction without
the concerned State’s consent or approval raises the issue of source legitimacy. Obviously, the situation in Kenya has a higher constitutive credential as Kenya is a State party to the Rome Statute, and therefore Kenya
accepted the possibility that an investigation proprio motu could be initiated over its territory and nationals. This is thus an example where the
source legitimacy of the Court is perceived as low, while objectively it is
firmly grounded. Conversely, the situation in Libya is a situation where
the source legitimacy of the Court is objectively low, but not perceived
as such by the current authorities since they are not the object of the ICC
prosecutions. On the other hand, the situation in Sudan objectively has
low source legitimacy and is also perceived to be at a nadir.
B. Process Legitimacy
Process legitimacy or procedural legitimacy relates to whether the
Court’s decisions were in accordance with regular and proper procedure.203 According to Franck, “[l]egitimacy is that attribute of a rule
which conduces to the belief that it is fair because it was made and is
applied in accordance with ‘right process.’”204 Hence, Franck stipulates
four “objective indicators” that, according to him, can assist in the identification of legitimate norms.205 Among these factors, Franck includes
the principles of coherence and consistency: “A rule is coherent when its
application treats like cases alike and when the rule relates in a principled
fashion to other rules of the same system. Consistency requires that a rule,
whatever its content, be applied uniformly in a ‘similar’ or ‘applicable’
instance.”206 Altogether, Franck’s “right process” and “objective indicator” aim to assess the fairness of the process. Not only is process legitimacy interlinked with source legitimacy in that it scrutinizes the legal
process to gain source legitimacy, but it also examines the process in applying the law. In this sense, process legitimacy looks at whether the
Court is treating like cases alike, whether it applies the law coherently
and consistently, and whether it follows the prescribed procedure.207

203. See SHANY, supra note 164, at 142; see also WOLFRUM & ROBEN, supra note 160, at 6.
204. THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 26 (1995).
205. Id. at 30.
206. Id. at 38.
207. See id. at 38; see also SHANY, supra note 164, at 142-43; see also WOLFRUM & ROBEN,
supra note 160, at 6-7.
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One way of assessing process legitimacy is to consider whether the
OTP exercises its discretionary power in accordance with principles that
were established beforehand.208 In this sense, if the OTP’s practice is
transparent, objective and consistent, it will have higher procedural legitimacy.209 While the OTP’s practice has been the subject of several process
legitimacy challenges, it remains governed by the ICC’s statutory framework.210 Indeed, many aspects related to the Court’s jurisdictional and
enforcement powers have resulted in a selective exercise of jurisdiction.
Our case studies have been tainted with three types of selective enforcement of international criminal justice that erode the process legitimacy of
the Court in these three situations, and more generally.
First, the Security Council’s role in the ICC presents several process
legitimacy concerns. Given that three out of the five permanent SC members (P-5) are not parties to the Rome Statute, its power to refer situations
to the ICC is perceived by the Sudanese authorities, in particular, as illegitimate and unfair.211 Furthermore, the inequality of power enshrined in
the veto system, and the partiality of the SC decision-making process,212
also shows that not all situations are treated alike (i.e., frail procedural
legitimacy). If Sudan and Libya, then why not Syria and North Korea? In
sum, the SC’s role in the ICC’s system raises the issues of free-riding,
sovereign equality and process legitimacy. 213
Furthermore, both SC referrals have been tainted with exemption
clauses discriminating on the ground of the nationality of the accused. SC
Resolution 1593, which referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC was
adopted by eleven votes in favor and four abstentions.214 Brazil and Algeria abstained due to the following exemption clause:
Decides that nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a
contributing State outside Sudan which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of that contributing State for all alleged acts or omissions

208. See Allison M. Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial
Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 510, 538 (2003); see also Margaret DeGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the International Criminal Court,
33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265, 290 (2012).
209. See Maria Varaki, Introducing a Fairness-Based Theory of Prosecutorial Legitimacy before the International Criminal Court, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 769, 784 (2016).
210. See DeGuzman, supra note 207, at 269. See generally Danner, supra note 207.
211. S.C. 5158th mtg., at 13 U.N. Doc. S/PV.5158 (Mar. 31, 2005).
212. See LUKAS H. MEYER, LEGITIMACY, JUSTICE AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 9
(2009).
213. Frédéric Mégret, What Sort of Global Justice is ‘International Criminal Justice’?, 13 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 77, 93 (2015).
214. S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 15, ¶ 1.
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arising out of or related to operations in Sudan established or authorized by the Council or the African Union, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by that State.215

This operative paragraph—inserted in the Resolution to assuage the
United States—attempts to provide immunity from the ICC’s jurisdiction
for any official that is not from the referred State or from a State party to
the Rome Statute.216 SC Resolution 1970 also contained an exemption
clause for officials and personnel of non-party States other than Libya.217
While the SC intended to immunize the nationals of powerful States not
parties to the Rome Statute from the ICC’s jurisdiction, the ICC holds
that SC Resolutions obligating a State to fully cooperate with the Court
entails that the immunities of its high-ranking State officials are implicitly waived.218 Thus, this implies that only States targeted by the SC lose
the immunity they normally enjoy under customary international law.
Clearly, this results in de facto inequality.
A second layer of selective enforcement is the OTP’s apparent reluctance to investigate certain situations despite clear evidence that
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court have been committed
therein.219 The averred dependence of the ICC on State’s cooperation has
even emerged as a principle guiding the OTP in its selection of situations.220 If Kenya, why not Afghanistan and Palestine?221 This is indeed
one of the main claims of the AU against the ICC and its alleged African
bias.222 Sudan has also constantly made this argument. During a recent
SC meeting on the situation in Darfur, the Sudanese representative stated:
“The Court is ultimately political; it therefore is not qualified to achieve
215. S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 15, ¶ 6; S.C. Res. 1970 supra note 57, ¶ 6; S.C. 5158th mtg.,
supra note 177 at 5 (noting that Algeria had some reservations on two points: first, further efforts
at peace and reconciliation should have been undertaken, and second, it regrets the double standards
of the SC). See also Robert Cryer, Sudan, Resolution 1593, and International Criminal Justice, 19
LEID. J. INT’L L. 195, 205 (2006).
216. Id.
217. S.C. Res. 1970 supra note 57, ¶ 6.
218. Decision on DRC’s Non-Compliance, supra note 32, at ¶ 6.
219. See Valentina Azarova & Triestino Mariniello, Why the ICC Needs A ‘Palestine Situation’
(More Than Palestine Needs the ICC): On the Court’s Potential Role(s) in the Israeli-Palestinian
Context, DIRITTI UMANI E DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE [D.U.D.I] 115 (2017) (It.).
220. See Sarah M. Nouwen, Legal Equality on Trial: Sovereigns and Individuals before the
International Criminal Court, 43 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 151, 170-71 (2012) [hereinafter Legal
Equality on Trial]; see also Office of the Prosecutor, ICC, Criteria for Selection of Situations and
Cases (June 2006).
221. See Azarova & Mariniello, supra note 219, at 3-6.
222. Many African heads of state have articulated these positions in African Union (AU) sessions. See, e.g, ICC Targets Africans on Race Basis: African Union Chair, DAILY NATION (May
27, 2013) http://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/ICC-targets-Africans-on-race-basis-AfricanUnion-chair/1064-1864200-3quy5fz/index.html.
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any kind of justice. In the 14 years since its establishment it has ruled on
four—just four—cases, all of them concerning African nationals, after
rejecting more than 9,000 other complaints.”223 He continued:
[T]he text of the Statute enshrines the inequality among those who are
subject to its jurisdiction, because it differentiates among them according to their nationality and not by the evidence presented against them.
Exceptions in the Statute are not implemented with regard to nationals
of developing States. 224

The prosecution of Kenyatta and Ruto galvanized this narrative, with the
use of several forums by their political coalition to attack the ICC as a
neocolonial court.225
Finally, a third layer of selectivity is the unequal application of the
law in respective situations. A practice that is, to a certain extent, contingent upon the mechanism used to trigger the Court’s jurisdiction, and in
particular, to the expected cooperation from States.226 All situations triggered by self-referral have strictly targeted non-State armed groups opposed to the referring authorities.227 Conversely, the other triggering
mechanisms led to more contrasted selection decisions, but were still
predicated on powerful States’ interests.228 On March 23, 2011, nearly
one month after the SC referral, the Security Council authorized NATO
forces to enforce a “No Fly Zone” over Libyan airspace to protect Libyan
citizens.229 The OTP followed up swiftly and announced its request for
arrest warrants for Muammar Gadaffi, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, and Abdullah Al-Senussi.230 In late June, the three arrest warrants were issued. 231

223. U.N. S.C., 7833 mtg. at 17, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7833 (Dec. 13, 2016).
224. Id. at 18.
225. See Geoffrey Lugano, Counter-Shaming the International Criminal Court’s Intervention
as Neocolonial: Lessons from Kenya, 11 INT’L J. OF TRANSITIONAL JUST. 9 (2017).
226. See Legal Equality on Trial, supra note 220, at 168.
227. See KERSTEN, supra note 58, at 164-65.
228. See Legal Equality on Trial, supra note 220, at 168.
229. S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 60.
230. See Victor Peskin & Mieczyslaw P Bodusynski, The Rise and Fall of the ICC in Libya
and the Politics of International Surrogate Enforcership, 10 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 272,
284 (2016); see also Luc Coté, Independence and Impartiality, in INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTORS
406 (Luc Reydams et al. eds., 2012) (“Libya . . . arguably seems more the result of political expediency in the wake of NATO intervention than a measure of justice.”).
231. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11-1, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and
Abdullah Alsenussi (June 27, 2011).
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As Stahn duly observed, the alignment of the ICC with the NATO operation conflated the judicial and military arms of powerful States.232 Furthermore, despite allegations of crimes committed by NATO during its
intervention, the OTP quickly eschewed investigations of crimes committed by the western alliance.233 The rebels’ and then current governmental forces during and after the uprising have also been generally
spared from the OTP.234 The recent arrest warrant against Al-Werfalli
might on first glance appear to change this picture. However, despite having been in the rebel forces against Gaddafi during the Libyan revolution,
Al-Werfalli then sided with the Libyan National Army (LNA) which
fights against the UN-backed Government of National Accord for control
of central and southern Libya.235 Hence, one may qualify the ICC’s position over Libya as one-sided.236
The situations in Kenya and Darfur, Sudan, are the only ones where
both sides, including the governmental authorities, have been prosecuted
before the ICC. They are also the only situations where the ICC intervention was not at the behest of the current authorities.237 While from an external point of view, the prosecution of both sides to the violence appears

232. Carsen Stahn, Libya, the International Criminal Court and Complementarity: A Test for
‘Shared Responsibility’, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 325, 329-332 (2012).
233. Id. at 332.
234. Id. at 335.
235. Mark Kersten, Will the International Criminal Court’s latest target in Libya be brought
to justice? THE WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage
/wp/2017/08/31/will-the-international-criminal-courts-latest-target-in-libya-be-brought-to-justice/?utm_term=.7d7b19cc25a7.
236. Office of the Prosecutor, Third Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court to the U.N. Security Council pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011), ¶ 54 (March 16, 2012) (“In
its third report to the SC pursuant to Resolution 1970, the Office of the Prosecutor correctly affirmed [t]he Office does have a mandate . . . to investigate allegations of crimes by all actors.”).
237. Côte d’Ivoire, not being a State party to the ICC, could only wait for the Prosecutor to use
its proprio motu powers or for a referral from a State party. As no State referral was forthcoming,
the OTP in concord with the new government of Côte d’Ivoire, requested the Pre-Trial Chamber to
be authorized to open an investigation. See THE INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, SITUATION IN THE
REPUBLIC OF CÔTE D’IVOIRE, CASE INFORMATION SHEET (Aug. 6, 2014) https://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/CharlesBleGoudeEng.pdf. While Georgia cooperated with the
Court until around six months before the OTP request for an authorization to investigate, its Justice
Minister immediately after the Pre-Trial Chamber authorization, declared that it welcomed the fact
that the ICC was stepping in, id. Indeed, it has been argued that Georgia implicitly preferred that
the OTP takes the burden of bringing a major power such as Russia to the Court. See Aaron Matta
& Anca Iordache, The ICC is Not Shying Away from the Georgian Challenge, OPINIO JURIS (Feb.
19, 2016), http://opiniojuris.org/2016/02/19/the-icc-is-not-shying-away-from-the-georgian-challenge/. Note that the admissibility of the situation in Uganda was also addressed proprio motu by
the PTC. See THE INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, SITUATION IN UGANDA, CASE INFORMATION SHEET
ICC-02/04-01/15, (JAN 2017) https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda/ongwen/documents/ongweneng.pdf.
No formal admissibility challenge was lodged by Uganda. In contrast, Côte d’Ivoire challenged the
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as more legitimate, internally the concerned authorities decry that they
are targeted because they lack support from Western States. Undeniably,
the ICC’s selectivity and perceived lack of independence from States
from a rule of law perspective undermines its procedural legitimacy.
To sum up, the three situations explored raise various issues of selectivity and thus of process legitimacy. The situation in Sudan and Libya
involve the controversial role of the SC. While Libya is not criticizing the
SC for its selectivity in deciding which situation to refer to the Court,
Sudan is labeling the SC, as well as the ICC, as neo-colonial institutions
targeting only developing countries. Objectively, Libya could raise the
same critique, but it omits to do so, presumably because the SC referral
to the ICC serves the current authorities interest. In contrast to Libya and
all other situations presently under investigation by the ICC, Sudan and
Kenya are the only situations where the state authorities have also been
the subject to arrest warrants and proceedings. While an equal application
of the law to all parties may on a normative point increase the legitimacy
of the Court, States subjected to a standard that is not applied to all situation will raise a critique of situation selectivity.
C. Outcome Legitimacy
Outcome legitimacy may be understood in two distinct ways. Both
relate to the content of the outcome; one is determined on its legality; the
other on its moral justification.238 The legality of a decision relates to its
source and process legitimacy. In other words, the legal outcome legitimacy of a decision is predetermined by the other legitimacy grounds. The
moral outcome legitimacy of the ICC or of one of its decision has to be
distinguished from its legal validity (or process). The substantive value
underlying it are at stakes. For our purpose, the substantive values questioned in an outcome moral legitimacy assessment pertains to the “goodness” of the ICC’s intervention, its decision and policy. This conception
of outcome moral legitimacy interacts with social legitimacy in that the
outcome of the decision is dependent on whether it is reflective of society.239 Overall, outcome legitimacy charges can rely on one or two distinct grounds or transit from one to the other.
The order to arrest and surrender Al-Bashir has, for instance, been
challenged as being in contradiction with the immunity heads of States
admissibility of the case against Simone Gbagbo. See Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/12,
Decision on Côte d’Ivoire’s Challenge to the Admissibility of the Case Against Simone Gbagbo.
238. See SHANY, supra note 164, at 143-44.
239. See Mikael Madsen, Explaining the Power of International Courts in Their Context: From
Legitimacy to Legitimization, in RSCAS POLICY PAPERS 2012/07 7, 23 (2012).
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are entitled to under customary international law (i.e., immunity ratione
personae).240 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 Case affirmed that high-ranking State officials entitled to immunity ratione personae enjoy full immunity from criminal
jurisdiction and inviolability when travelling abroad, and that States violate their obligation under international law towards another State if they
fail to respect the immunities of the latter State’s officials. 241 While the
ICJ referred in obiter dicta to the unavailability of immunities in proceedings before “certain international criminal courts,” it did not address the
issue of whether the same immunities are available when a State enforces
an ICC arrest warrant.242
On the one hand, the Rome Statute provides in Article 27 (2) that
the immunity ratione personae, to which heads of States are normally
entitled under customary international law, does not bar the Court from
exercising its jurisdiction.243 It is generally accepted that States party to
the Rome Statute have waived their immunity in respect to the ICC and
to other States Parties enforcing an ICC request for arrest and surrender.244
However, as a treaty it is contended that Article 27 is only waiving the
immunity of officials from States parties to the Rome Statute.245 According to the law of treaties, the Statute cannot affect the rights of non-party
States.246 Article 98 of the Rome Statute indeed recognizes that “[t]he
Court may not proceed with a request for surrender . . . which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under
international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a
person . . . of a third State.”247 Nevertheless, the ICC has constantly requested its States Parties to arrest Al-Bashir despite his position as head

240. See Asad G. Kiyani, Al-Bashir & the ICC: The Problem of Head of State Immunity, 12
CHINESE J. INT’L L. 467 (2013).
241. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (D.R.C. v. Bel.), Judgment, 2002
I.C.J. Rep. 3 (Feb. 14).
242. Id. at 22-23.
243. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 27 (2).
244. See Paola Gaeta, Does President Al Bashir Enjoy Immunity from Arrest?, 7 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 315, 328 (2009); see also Claus Kress and Kimberly Prost, Article 98: Cooperation with
Respect to Waiver of Immunity and Consent to Surrender, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1612 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2008).
245. See Akande, supra note 27; see also Commission of the African Union, Press Release No.
002/2012 (Jan. 8, 2012).
246. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 34, May 23 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties].
247. Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 98
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of State of a “third State” (i.e., a State not party to the Rome Statute). 248
All the findings of non-compliance in the Al-Bashir case are indeed about
such failure.
The yet unsettled legal question is the relationship between Article
27(2) and 98(1), particularly in situations referred to the Court by the SC
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In its first string of decisions over
the arrest and surrender of Al-Bashir, the Court eschewed the tension between the two Articles governing immunities by simply turning a blind
eye towards Article 98(1)’s existence.249 The AU explicitly responded to
these decisions on the ground of being legally incorrect, and thus reiterated its call for not cooperating with the Court on this matter. 250 The ICC
reacted a couple of years later by issuing a second string of decisions on
the obligation to arrest and surrender Al-Bashir, which distanced itself
from its previous reasoning on the relevance of Article 98.251 In Decision
on DRC’s Non-Compliance, the Chamber acknowledged that Article
98(1) forbids the Court from requesting States to act inconsistently with
their international obligation, international law immunities included.252
Nonetheless, it considered that the SC Resolution 1593, referring the situation in Darfur, had the effect of implicitly waiving the immunities of
the head of State of Sudan.253 Although this new reasoning managed to
convince some scholars and States,254 the AU position was too entrenched
to be reversible. In 2017, the ICC took a new avenue with regards to the
obligation of States to arrest and surrender Al-Bashir. In Decision on

248. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-7, Request to
all States Parties to the Rome Statute for the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Al Bashir (Mar. 6,
2009).
249. See Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-140, supra note 32, ¶ 37; see also Dire Tladi, The ICC
Decisions on Chad and Malawi: On Cooperation, Immunities, and Article 98, 11 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 199, 204-206 (2013).
250. See Akande, supra note 27, at 23.
251. See Tladi, supra note 249, at 204-06.
252. Id. at 211; see also Decision on DRC’s Non-Compliance, supra note 32, ¶ 24.
253. See Tladi, supra note 249, at 229; Decision on DRC’s Non-Compliance, supra note 32, ¶
29.
254. See, e.g., Nerina Boschiero, The ICC Judicial Finding on Non-Cooperation Against the
DRC and No Immunity for Al-Bashir Based on UNSC Resolution 1593, 13 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST.
625 (2015); Erika De Wet, The Implications of the Visit of Al Bashir to South Africa for International and Domestic Law, 13 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1049-1071 (2015); Manuel Ventura, Escape
from Johannesburg?: Sudanese President Al-Bashir Visits South Africa, and the Implicit Removal
of Head of State Immunity by the UN Security Council in Light of Al-Jedda, 13 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST.
1022-1026 (2015); Cf. Dire Tladi, The Duty on South Africa to Arrest and Surrender President AlBashir under South African and International Law: A Perspective from International Law, 13 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1027, 1042-1044 (2015).
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South Africa’s Non-Compliance, Pre-Trial Chamber II decided not to uphold the waiver theory affirmed in its previous case law.255 Rather, the
Chamber found that Sudan’s obligation to fully cooperate with the Court,
which is underpinned by the Chapter VII power character of SC Resolution 1593, puts it in a position analogous to those of States parties to the
Rome Statute. 256 Hence, like for the immunity of heads of States parties
to the Rome Statute, Al-Bashir’s immunity is irrelevant vis-à-vis the jurisdiction of State Parties seeking to enforce the ICC arrest warrant. By
the same token, the Chamber found that Article 98(1) was not applicable
to Al-Bashir, and thus South Africa failed to cooperate with the Court by
not enforcing the arrest warrant.257
While the debate remained open on the effect of SC referrals on immunities, a second strand for not arresting Al-Bashir was added on the
ground that peace and stability required that Al-Bashir not be impeded in
his traveling. Indeed, States such as Djibouti, Uganda and South Africa
started to claim that their commitment to international peace and security,
friendly relations between States in the region, and engagement in peace
process between Sudan and South Sudan, required that Al-Bashir be welcomed in their territory without the fear of being arrested and surrendered
to the Court.258 In response, the ICC affirmed:
[W]hile sensitive to these political considerations . . . State Parties to
the Statute must pursue any legitimate, or even desirable, political objectives within the boundaries of their legal obligations vis-à-vis
the Court. Indeed, it is not in the nature of legal obligations that they
can be put aside or qualified for political expediency.259

In October 2016, while proceedings concerning South Africa’s failure to have arrested Al-Bashir were ongoing at domestic and ICC levels,
South Africa surprised the world by filing in accordance with Article
127(1) of the Rome Statute, a notification of withdrawal from the ICC.260
In a rather exceptionally detailed manner, the South African withdrawal
notice exposed the reasons for leaving the Court. Among these were included: the SC not having used Article 16 of the Rome Statute, the
Court’s African bias, the Court’s standing on the immunity of heads of
255. Decision on South Africa’s Non-Compliance, supra note 32, ¶ 96.
256. Id. ¶¶ 87-89.
257. Id. ¶¶ 93, 123.
258. See, e.g., Decision on Djibouti’s Non-Compliance, supra note 32, ¶ 6; Decision on
Uganda’s Non-Compliance, supra note 32, ¶ 7.
259. Decision on Uganda’s Non-Compliance, supra note 32, ¶ 14.
260. See Daniel J. H. Wand, South Africa’s withdrawal from the International Criminal Court:
A Time for Reflection, EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (Oct. 27, 2016),
https://ecr2p.leeds.ac.uk/643/.
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States, and the need to balance peace and justice.261 The letter accompanying the notice concluded by stating: “Under these circumstances South
Africa is of the view that to continue to be a State Party to the Rome
Statute will compromise its efforts to promote peace and security on the
African Continent.”262 By focusing on the peace versus justice dilemma,
South Africa was contesting the politico-moral objective of the ICC.
Overall, the legitimacy challenge with regards to the situation in Darfur
had gradually shifted from the unlawful to the unjust.263
The Libyan admissibility challenges were not predicated on the legality of the ICC’s exercise of jurisdiction over Gaddafi and Al-Senussi.
Rather, the Libyan authorities claimed that its people had a moral right to
bring the former regime to justice with a trial in Libya by Libyan
judges.264 The debate about who ought to try Gaddafi and Al-Senussi remained within the legal environment of an admissibility challenge and its
limbs.265 Nevertheless, the ultimate point that Libya considered valid was
its clear willingness to prosecute Gaddafi and Al-Senussi for conduct that
was arguably broader in scope than the ICC cases,266 albeit Libya’s relative ability to do so.267 In other words, Libya was convinced that surrender
of its high-profile cases to the Court was unjust.268
Kenya challenged the legitimacy of the Court over its head of State
and deputy head of State on the grounds that such proceedings were destabilizing its internal affairs.269 The obligation for which a finding of
non-compliance was issued should not be seen strictly in terms of noncompliance because of the nature of the obligation. Rather, the situation
in Kenya stands as an example of how a whole caseload may collapse
when there is direct involvement of the State in the situation, and the latter
disagrees with the potential outcome of a successful prosecution. The accused’s challenges, for their part, were legal in that they relied on the
dissenting opinion of Judge Kaul who opposed the investigation in the

261. South Africa Withdrawal to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra
note 1, at 2.
262. Id.
263. One of South Africa’s further reason for leaving the Court relied on the unjust treatment
it received when it asked for a consultation under Article 97 of the Rome Statute. Id.
264. See KERSTEN, supra note 58, at 125.
265. Id. at 151.
266. See Kevin Jon Heller, Radical Complementarity, 14 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 637 (2016).
267. See Jurdi¸ supra note 115, at 219 (noting that the “unavailability” of Gaddafi to be tried
in Tripoli also applies mutates mutandi to the ICC).
268. See Heller, supra note 266, at 663.
269. See Laurence R. Helfer & Anne E. Showalter, Opposing International Justice: Kenya’s
Integrated Backlash Strategy Against the ICC, 17 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 1, 22 (2017).
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Kenyan situation.270 Indeed, Judge Kaul contended that one element was
missing for the ICC having jurisdiction over the 2007 post-election violence, namely that they were not in furtherance of a State or State-like
organizational policy, and thus could not be considered as crimes against
humanity.271 After repetitively arguing that Judge Kaul’s interpretation of
the Statute had to be retained as the correct one, the defence strategy
changed with recurrent appeal to the Security Council for a deferral of
the Kenyan proceedings.272 Concomitantly, the counsels for Kenyatta and
Ruto were also seeking to have special conditions attached to their positions as head of State and deputy president, respectively—a request partially accepted by the Court and the ASP.273 While the accused exchanges
with the Court were done using legal tools, the ultimate purpose was with
an emphasis on the unjust interference with the domestic affairs of the
State. The most dramatic statement of this contention came from the AU,
which adopted a decision right after the 2013 election “expressing concern at the threat that the indictment” of Kenyatta and Ruto “may pose to
the on-going efforts in the promotion of peace, national healing and reconciliation” in Kenya and the entire region.274 The outcome legitimacy
concern was thus not anymore legal but principled on the balance between peace and justice. The claim was indeed that the ICC’s intervention
in Kenya obfuscated the prospects for reconciliation, peace and security
on the ground, which related to the delicate balance between law and
moral.
III. ADDRESSING LEGITIMACY TALKS
The preceding sections show that the situations where there are
traces of non-compliance are all affected by various illegitimacy grounds.
The question is then: how to address these legitimacy deficits? Which
legitimacy ground ought to be addressed? What needs to be changed in
how the ICC is operating to increase its overall legitimacy? The method
270. See id. at 43-44; see also Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC01/09-01/11 and ICC-01/09/02/11, Application on Behalf of the Government of the Republic of Kenya pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC
Statute (Mar. 31, 2011).
271. Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11-2, Dissenting Opinion by Judge Hans-Peter Kaul to
Pre-Trial Chamber II’s “Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for summons to appear for William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joashua Arap Sang” (Mar. 15, 2011).
272. See Helfer & Showalter, supra note 268, at 42.
273. Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11, Defence Request for Conditional Excusal from
Continuous Presence at Trial (Sept. 23, 2013); Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11, Defence Request Pursuant to Article 63(1) of the Rome Statute and Rule 134quarter of the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence to Excuse Mr. William Samoei Ruto from Attendance at Trial (Dec. 16, 2013).
274. Assembly of the African Union, Decision on International Jurisdiction and the International Criminal Court, Doc. AU Doc. Assembly/A.U./Dec.482(XXI) (May 26-27, 2013).
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of evaluation this article proposes is to consider the fight against impunity
as a global public good (GPG).
The fight against impunity and, in particular, the idea underlying it,
that is, accountability for international crimes, can be theoretically conceived as a GPG. GPGs present values in which every States has an interest.275 As Albin states, “[t]heir widespread benefits cross national
boundaries, population groups and even generations, and can rarely be
denied those who decide not to contribute to the supply of the goods
themselves.”276 Indeed, in principle, all individuals and States benefit
from the fight against impunity, and no one can be excluded from benefiting from it. It is the non-rivalrous and non-excludable features of the
fight against impunity that make it a GPG. As States have little incentives
not to free ride on the efforts of others, it “raises a problem of collective
action.”277 In other words, to counter under provision or underuse (or the
complete opposites) of a GPG, global governance has to come into play.
What type of GPG, and in particular what type of cooperation is
required, in the fight against impunity? The literature reveals that GPGs
can depend on the “single best effort” of one actor, or on the “aggregate
effort” of the international community or on the actions of all the international community, including its “weakest link.”278 When a GPG can be
provided by a single State or a small group of States, it is a “single best
effort” GPG.279 This type of action is also called the “best shot”, in that it
is conceived as “the best possible and most immediate contribution.” 280
The ad hoc tribunals can be conceived as such, as they were quickly set
up by a small group of States in reaction to a crisis.281 However, a “best

275. See Fabrizio Cafaggi & David D. Caron, Global Public Goods amidst a Plurality of Legal
Orders: A Symposium, 23. EUR. J. INT’L L. 643, 644 (2012); see also André Nollkaemper, International Adjudication of Global Public Goods: The Intersection of Substance and Procedure, 23 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 769, 776 (2012).
276. Cecilia Albin, Negotiating International Cooperation: Global Public Goods and Fairness, 29 REV. INT’L STUD. 365, 367 (2003).
277. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY
OF GROUPS (1971); Nollkaemper, supra note 275, at 776; see also Cafaggi & Caron, supra note
275, at 44.
278. SCOTT BARRETT, WHY COOPERATE? THE INCENTIVE TO SUPPLY GLOBAL PUBLIC
GOODS 74 (2010); INGE KAUL, ISABELLE GRUNBERG, & MARC STERN, GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS:
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 486-488 (1999).
279. See Daniel Bodansky, What’s in a Concept? Global Public Goods, International Law, and
Legitimacy, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 651, 663 (2012) (“Examples of public goods that depend on a
single-best-effort include scientific and medical discoveries, the deflection of an asteroid about to
pulverize the earth, and the efforts of an individual champion in battle”); see also KAUL ET AL.,
supra note 278, at 487-88.
280. KAUL ET AL., supra note 278, at 487.
281. See id.
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shot” cannot effectively tackle the fight against impunity, as commission
of international crimes does neither stop at the borders of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda nor the 1990’s.
An aggregate effort public good implies that we need a summation
of equal contribution to effectively supply the GPG; 282 they are mostly
typical for the protection of the environment.283 An aggregate effort does
not mean that all States’ contributions are needed as “[t]he contribution
of one actor can theoretically substitute for that of another, so it does not
really matter who contributes.”284 However, “the degree to which the
problem is solved depends on the overall efforts of the global community” and, in particular, on the “participation and compliance by the big
players.”285 The inability of the international community to genuinely embark on a universal cooperative regime with regards to climate change
shows that free riding poses a crucial challenge to aggregate effort
GPGs.286
A “weakest-link” GPG poses similar problems, as they also require
the cooperation of the international community. In contrast with aggregate effort GPGs, cooperation by all is required, as “a single weak link
will undo” the work of others.287 Scott Barrett eloquently showed that the
eradication of diseases such as the smallpox required the participation of
every country; otherwise the virus would have continued to spread.288 To
the “weakest link” type, Bodansky adds securing nuclear materials, securing maritime transport and accountability for international crimes.289
Indeed, accountability for international crimes “can be undermined . . .
by a single country that gives criminals impunity.” 290
Having identified what type of GPG the fight against impunity is,
the type of cooperation to provide it becomes clearer. Weakest-link
GPGs, as wells as aggregate effort public goods require centralized institutions to produce them.291 The ICC, the first permanent international
criminal court, comes in as the centralized institution to facilitate the fight
against impunity. The Rome Statute drafters’ aspiration clearly reflects
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

See id.
See BARRETT, supra note 278, at 74.
KAUL ET AL., supra note 278, at 487.
Bodansky, supra note 279, at 659.
See William D. Nordhaus, Paul Samuelson and Global Public Goods (2005), in
SAMUELSONIAN ECONOMICS AND THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 8 (2005).
287. Bodansky, supra note 279, at 661.
288. See BARRETT, supra note 278, at 47.
289. See Bodansky, supra note 279, at 661.
290. Id.
291. See Gregory Shaffer, International Law and Global Public Goods in a Legal Pluralist
World, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 669, 679 (2012).
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the normative attributes of GPGs. As the preamble of the Rome Statute
affirms it, the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC are said to
“threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world.”292 Hence, they
are referred to as “the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole” for which “effective prosecution must be ensured
by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international
cooperation.”293 Although the Court has been established to contribute to
the provision of the fight against impunity, it can also be considered as
an intermediate GPG.294
If one accepts that the fight against impunity and the ICC are GPGs,
then a GPG perspective can be used to provide a political-normative
choice on which of the legitimacy talks is important. What needs to be
changed to increase the legitimacy of the Court: non-consensualism, selectivity, or the balance between peace and justice? The three situations
we have analyzed are ones where non-compliance has been deemed grave
enough to refer the matter to an external actor, the ASP or the SC. As
pointed out at the beginning of this article, compliance with an institution
is taken as an expression of social legitimacy. Conversely, source, process and outcome legitimacy are three normative standards of legitimacy.295 While social legitimacy expresses the perceived legitimacy of an
institution, normative legitimacy offers “objective metric[s] for gauging
‘actual legitimacy.’”296 This article posited a circular relationship between
these two approaches to legitimacy. 297 That is, normative legitimacy
standards are objective grounds for “testing the correctness of perceptions.”298 Indeed, legitimacy should not be calculated exclusively on the
basis of perceptions. And, it should neither be evaluated strictly from the
yardstick of normative legitimacy without taking into account the views
of its main stakeholders. We thus have a legitimacy account that somewhat intermingles the normative and the social. By using a GPG perspective on the legitimacy talks affecting the ICC, this article aims to assess
292. Rome Statute, supra note 4, pmbl.
293. Id.
294. See KAUL ET AL., supra note 278, at 13–14; see also Mégret, supra note 213, at 93; see
also Nollkaemper, supra note 275, at 783.
295. See Silje Aambø Langvatn & Theresa Squatrito, Conceptualising and Measuring the Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals, in THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS 51 (Nubuo Hayashi et al. eds., 2017).
296. Sergey Vasiliev, Between International Criminal Justice and Injustice: Theorising Legitimacy, in THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 80 (Nubuo Hayashi et al.
eds., 2017).
297. For other authors who agree that such relationship is important, see id. at 80; see also Çalı
et al., supra note 3, at 3.
298. Vasiliev, supra note 296, at 80.
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institutional changes, that on the one hand respond to the normative and
legitimacy deficits affecting the ICC, and on the other hand may also enable the ICC to become more effective in its provision of the fight against
impunity.
A. The Effective Supply of a GPG and Non-consensualism
The situations in Sudan and Libya emerged from SC referrals, and
the situation in Kenya has been initiated proprio motu by the ICC Prosecutor. These three situations are all showing evidences that the source
legitimacy of the ICC is contestable on the ground of non-consensualism.
The SC referrals are the epitome of what has been called the switch
to non-consensualism.299 Surely, the legal authority of the SC to establish
an international criminal tribunal that may exercise jurisdiction without
the explicit consent of the concerned States has been confirmed in
Tadic.300 Nonetheless, the ICC’s exercise of jurisdiction without the
State’s consent, thanks to a SC referral, has been repeatedly decried as
illegitimate by the Sudanese authorities; the new Libyan authorities have
not raised this point yet. 301 During the Rome Conference, “a small but
vocal minority” opposed the triggering of the ICC’s jurisdiction by the
Security Council, without the State with primary jurisdiction consent.302
Still, it was clear that allowing the SC to refer a situation to the Court
“was necessary in order to enable the Council to make use of the court as
an alternative to establishing ad hoc tribunals and as a response to crimes
which affront the conscience of mankind.”303 That being said, the German
proposal of establishing a permanent international criminal court with
universal jurisdiction was certainly much more sensible to the type of
GPG the fight against impunity is.304 However, to obtain a greater support

299. See Nico Krisch, The Decay of Consent: International Law in an Age of Global Public
Goods, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2014).
300. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
301. See Dapo Akande, The African Union’s Response to the ICC’s Decision on Bashir’s Immunity: Will the ICJ Get Another Immunity Case?, EJIL TALK! (Feb. 8, 2012) https://www.ejiltalk.
org/the-african-unions-response-to-the-iccs-decisions-on-bashirs-immunity-will-the-icj-get-another-immunity-case/.
302. Charles Chernor Jalloh, The African Union, the Security Council, and the International
Criminal Court, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND AFRICA 181, 189 (Charles Chernor Jalloh et al. eds., 1st. ed. 2017).
303. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Forty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/49/10, at
44 (1994).
304. See Hans-Peter Kaul, Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction, in THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 584 (Antonio Cassese et
al. eds., 2002).
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in favor of the Statute, the drafters decided to leave the “inherent universal jurisdiction” proposal aside.305 Instead, the Court was established with
a dormant universal jurisdiction;306 it can exercise jurisdiction over a situation, where territoriality and active nationality are lacking, if the SC
refers it to the Prosecutor under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.307
Non-consensualism may be seen as necessary for the effective supply of GPGs.308 As William Nordhaus, an influential economist, observed:
[T]he Westphalian system leads to severe problems for global public
goods. The requirement for unanimity is in reality a recipe for inaction
. . . To the extent that global public goods may become more important
in the decades ahead, one of our major challenges is to devise mechanisms that overcome the bias toward the status quo and the voluntary
nature of current international law in life-threatening issues.309

The fight against impunity is the type of GPG that requires action
by all, in particular those least willing or able to do so. Accordingly, the
SC referrals are necessary even if they lead to contentions about the
source legitimacy of the Court.
Nonetheless, under a GPG perspective, the ICC remains an imperfect institution. Accountability for international crimes is a weakest link
GPG.310 While a weakest-link GPG depends on the cooperation of all
States, the Rome Statute failed to attract ratification by many of the most
powerful and warring States. As not all States are realistically subject to
its jurisdiction, it cannot effectively supply a fully weakest link. Its current structure is not even fit for an aggregate effort GPG as this requires
the cooperation of at least the most influential States. Since key actors are
absent from its cooperation framework, an institution like the ICC cannot
305. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY ON
ROME STATUTE 280 (2010) (listing all the following as examples of States supporting Germany’s proposal: UN Doc. A/CONF.183/SR.2, par. 54 (Sweden); UN Doc. A/CONF.183/SR.3,
par. 21 (Czech Republic); par. 42 (Latvia); par. 76 (Costa Rica); UN Doc. A/CONF.183/SR.4/, par.
12 (Albania); par. 38 (Ghana); par. 57 (Namibia); UN Doc. A/CONF.183/SR.5 (Italy); par. 21
(Hungary); par. 32 (Azerbaijan); UN Doc. A/CONF.183/SR.6, par. 4 (Belgium); par. 16 (Ireland);
par. 51-52 (Netherlands); par. 69 (Luxembourg); UN Doc. A/CONF.183 /SR.8, par. 18; (Bosnia
and Herzegovina); par. 62 (Ecuador)).) To read Germany’s defense of its proposal, see U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court,
4th Plenary Meeting, ¶20-21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/SR.4 (June 16, 1998);
306. See HECTOR OLASOLO, THE TRIGGERING PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 14 (2005).
307. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 13 (b).
308. See Nordhaus, supra note 286 (arguing in favor of non-consensualism). But see Krisch,
supra note 299 (criticizing this movement).
309. Nordhaus, supra note 286, at 8.
310. See Bodansky, supra note 279, at 651–61.
THE
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be entirely effective, even with the type of non-consensualism it currently
embodies.311 What the Rome Statute drafters managed to establish is an
(intermediate) aggregate effort GPG, with some weakest link to States
neither party to the Rome Statute nor with a veto right at the Security
Council. The consent of certain States is thus foregone;312 otherwise, the
GPG cannot be minimally supplied. This means that the fight against impunity is not fully supplied by the ICC: a jurisdictional gap remains for
crimes committed by P-5 nationals (or nationals of States that have the
support of a P-5 member) in territories of States not party to the Rome
Statute.
Obviously, this result might be unsatisfactory to many. Nico Krisch,
for one, has argued that the shift to non-consensualism exacerbates the
inequality between powerful and weak states.313 And, indeed, the ICC’s
inability to fight impunity indiscriminately has significant impacts on the
Court’s process legitimacy.
B. Processing Self-Interest?
Three types of selectivity issue arise in our case studies: one within
a situation, one inter-situational, and one within the world at large. The
last one involves the SC, the two others are results of the OTP’s prosecutorial discretion. That the Prosecutor select her situations and cases according to the best chances to bring suspects to trial and secure convictions is not surprising. As Robert Cryer observed, it is “essentially
impossible” that selective prosecution does not occur. 314 It may even be
called in some instances a wise prosecutorial strategy. 315 Surely, performance is one of the factors to be taken into account when designing a
prosecutorial policy.316 And, selective prosecution is certainly linked to
expected cooperation.317

311.
312.
313.
314.

See Krisch, supra note 299, at 9.
See id.
See generally Krisch, supra note 298.
ROBERT CRYER, PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: SELECTIVITY AND THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW REGIME 192 (2005).
315. See Annalisa Ciampi, Legal Rules, Policy Choice and Political Realities in the Functioning of the Cooperation Regime of the International Criminal Court, in COOPERATION AND THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: PERSPECTIVES FROM THEORY AND PRACTICE, NOTTINGHAM
STUDIES ON HUMAN RIGHTS 47 (Olympia Bekou et al. eds., 2016).
316. See Birju Kotecha, The ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor and the Limits of Performance
Indicators, 15 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 543 (2017).
317. See CRYER, supra note 314, at 219-20 (discussing the ICTY not prosecuting crimes committed by NATO as it was dependent on its cooperation, or ICTR not prosecuting crimes committed
by RPF because of its dependence on Rwanda).
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Our case studies permit us to observe that where the Prosecutor selectively prosecutes a group that is fighting against the State (as in Libya),
the State authorities are willing to cooperate—if non-cooperation occurs
it is essentially due to inability. And, that when both sides to the conflict
or violence are prosecuted, including the ruling authorities (as in Sudan
and Kenya), non-cooperation is mainly due to the unwillingness to submit
itself to a prosecution that goes against self-interest.
The literature on GPGs distinguishes compliance problems (in
weakest-link GPGs) under the unable or unwilling categories.318 In cases
where the State lacks capacity, assistance from other actors to enable the
weak State to contribute to the GPG seems to be in good order.319 This is
indeed the line of action the ICC took with regards to Libya’s failure to
surrender Gaddafi. The Pre-Trial Chamber considered its referral of the
matter to the SC as not designed to sanction Libya but to seek assistance
to eliminate impediments to cooperation.320
It is acknowledged that “unwillingness” poses a greater challenge
than “inability.”321 It seems that to compel an unwilling State to cooperate, only two options are on the table: either buying-off or coercing the
State.322 Coercion, whether it is economic or military, is generally seen as
too costly to be efficient.323 Thus, buying-off is the favored way to induce
cooperation from an unwilling State. For instance, the OTP has adopted
a strategy where it encourages States to self-refer situations happening in
their territories.324 In exchange for self-referrals, the OTP leaves out the
referring authorities’ crimes from its investigation, thus ensuring cooperation with the Court.325 While self-referrals were initially conceived to
cure the inability of States to exercise their responsibility, the OTP targeting of rebel movements or insurgent groups manages to also stave off
any unwillingness to cooperate.326 Accordingly, Schabas observes “prosecutions of only one side in the conflict seem to be the price of the self318. See Barrett, supra note 278, at 47; see also Bodansky, supra note 279, at 661-62.
319. See Bodansky, supra note 279, at 661.
320. See Decision on Libya’s Non-compliance, supra note 32, ¶ 33. (“The Chamber concurs
that this provision makes available to the Court an additional tool so that it may seek assistance to
eliminate impediments to cooperation.”)
321. Bodansky, supra note 279, at 662.
322. See id.
323. See generally ABRAHAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY (1998).
324. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR IN THE ICC, Report on the Activities Performed During the
First Three Years (June 2003 – June 2006), at 7 (Sept. 12, 2006).
325. See Alana Tiemessen, The International Criminal Court and the Politics of Prosecutions,
18 Int’l J. Hum. Rts. 444 (2014); see also William Schabas, Complementarity in Practice: Some
Uncomplimentary Thoughts, 19 Crim. L. F. 5 (2008) [hereinafter Complementarity in Practice].
326. See Tiemessen, supra note 325; see also Complementarity in Practice, supra note 325.
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referral strategy.”327 Should the same strategy be adopted with regards to
States where source legitimacy is a concern? After all, going against the
self-interest of a State that has grounds to denounce the source legitimacy
of the Court’s jurisdiction is riskier than situations where a State took “the
sovereign decision to relinquish its jurisdiction in favor of the Court.”328
Cooperation with the ICC comes at a certain cost. The daunting question
is: what are the benefits for States in cooperating with the ICC? At first
glance, a compliance pull could be generated by, when source legitimacy
is lacking, strictly sticking to the State’s interest in the prosecutorial discretion as to who to prosecute. Though focused on cooperation, a GPG
perspective would go against such policy.
Classifying the ICC as an intermediate GPG aims to foster cooperation with the Court in its provision of the fight against impunity. However, “[c]ooperation is not an end in itself—it is a means to an end.”329
Accountability for international crimes is the end for which the Court has
been established. Furthermore, it is crucial to recall that it is the non-rivalrous and non-excludable character of the fight against impunity’s benefits that make it a final global public good. 330 Non-rivalry means that if
the good is used by one, it does not reduce its availability to others. 331
Non-excludability means that no one can practically be let off from consuming the good.332 In theory, everyone can benefit from the fight against
impunity and no one can be excluded from benefiting from it. However,
in a process of selective justice, one group is indeed excluded from the
benefits of the fight against impunity; the fight against impunity is only
used against rebel groups; the State agents’ victims are denied accountability.
The Court’s effects are externalities writ large.333 As Nouwen and
Werner demonstrated, those targeted by the ICC are identified as “enemies of mankind,” whereas those who enforce the ICC arrest warrant are

327. William Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International Criminal Court, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 731, 753 (2008).
328. Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-1497 Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Germain
Katanga Against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the
Case, ¶ 85 (Sept. 25, 2009).
329. KAUL ET AL., supra note 278.
330. See Paul Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 Rᴇᴠ. Eᴄᴏɴ. & Sᴛᴀᴛ. 387
(1954); see also OLSON, supra note 277; see also KAUL ET AL., supra note 278, at 2-3.
331. See KAUL ET AL., supra note 278; see also Tyler Cowen, Public Goods, in THE CONCISE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PublicGoods.html
332. See KAUL ET AL., supra note 278; see also Cowen, supra note 331.
333. Bodansky, supra note 279, at 658.

TECH TO EIC (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

5/14/2018 7:39 AM

Global Public Good Perspective on Criminal Courts

171

distinguished as friends of humanity.334 Chazal demonstrated that the
OTP allowed States to use the Court as a tool to eliminate their political
opponents as it also increased its own visibility and relevance. 335 According to Chazal, by letting States use the Court as a weapon in political
struggles, the ICC creates “negative externalities” as it perpetuates violence, conflict and harm in the local jurisdiction.336 Hence, she concludes
that “the Court does not prevent international crimes but legitimizes particular types of violence and causes social harms through its superficial
response to violence.”337 While selective prosecution as a strategy makes
the Court seem more effective, as it ensures cooperation, it produces a
“global public bad” rather than a “global public good.” The overproduction of “global public bads” is indeed a recognized phenomenon in economic theory, as it is implied that the provider ignores the costs.338 However, the purpose of cooperation in the fight against impunity, and of the
ICC as an intermediate GPG, is to provide for global public goods that
benefit all.
As buying-off State cooperation with de facto immunity from prosecutions is antithetical to the fight against impunity as a GPG, the OTP
would be well advised to dump this policy; irrespective of whether the
Court’s jurisdiction is triggered by self-referrals, SC referrals or investigation proprio motu. Instead of internalizing selective prosecutions, what
the ICC needs is strong responses from the ASP and/or the SC when noncompliance occurs. As buying-off state cooperation with selective prosecution leads to a “global public bad,” the threat to use the sticks in cases
of non-cooperation needs to be credible. PTC II has alerted the ASP and

334. Sarah Nouwen & Wouter Werner, Doing Justice to the Political: The International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 941 (2010).
335. See Nerida Chazal, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND GLOBAL SOCIAL
CONTROL: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN LATE MODERNITY 106-108 (2016).
336. Id. at 120-119.
337. Id. at 120.
338. See Todd Sandler, Assessing the Optimal Provision of Public Goods: In Search of the
Holy Grail, in PROVIDING GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: MANAGING GLOBALIZATION 138 (Inge Kaul
et al. eds., 2003); see also Bodansky, supra note 279, at 658, 664.
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the SC of the failure of several states to cooperate with the court by enforcing arrest warrants for Al-Bashir.339 Nothing has followed at the SC
level.340
The ASP, on the other hand, is contemplating developing procedures for the implementation of Article 97 Rome Statute.341 Article 97
contemplates the possibility for States to consult with the Court when
they face a problem in the execution of cooperation request.342 While PTC
II in Decision on South Africa’s Non-Compliance stressed that there was
nothing to consult upon regarding States parties’ obligation to arrest AlBashir, putting in place a process where States would be provided with
information on how cooperation makes them better off is one of the primary functions of international organizations.343 In providing information
about other States’ similar problems, preferences, behaviors and intentions, the ICC may change the State strategy in deciding whether or not
to cooperate with the Court.344
States cannot be expected to contribute in the fight against impunity
if this is not equally met by the ICC and other States. 345 The politics underpinning inter-situational selectivity mean that some States are expected to do more than others. However, the effective production of aggregate global public goods relies on strategies of reciprocal
cooperation.346 Otherwise, each State has an incentive not to contribute.
In this light, compliance is helped when States can verify whether other

339. See, e.g. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the Non-Compliance by
the Republic of Djibouti with the Request to Arrest and Surrender Omar Al-Bashir to the Court and
Referring the Matter to the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of the State Parties
to the Rome Statute (July 11, 2016); Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the
Non-Compliance by the Republic of Uganda with the Request to Arrest and Surrender Omar AlBashir to the Court and Referring the Matter to the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of the State Parties to the Rome Statute (July 11, 2016).
340. See ICC Prosecutor Asks Security Council to Act on Outstanding Arrest Warrants, U.N.
NEWS, (Dec. 12, 2017), https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/12/639172-icc-prosecutor-asks-security
-council-act-outstanding-arrest-warrants.
341. Official Records of the 14th Session of the Assembly of States Parties, Doc. ICCASP/14/20/Vol.I, ¶ 59. (Nov. 18-26, 2015).
342. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 97
343. See Lisa L. Martin, The Political Economy of International Cooperation, in GLOBAL
PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 55 (Inge Kaul et al. eds.,
1999).
344. See id. at 55.
345. See id.
346. See id.
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States are abiding with their obligations to exercise their jurisdiction over
those responsible for having committed international crimes.347
While information, transparency and reciprocity might incentivize
States to cooperate with the ICC, the controversial role of the SC in the
ICC’s system and how it attempted to tailor the Court’s jurisdiction poses
significant process legitimacy concerns that do not solely rest with the
Court.348 From a GPG perspective, the few SC permanent members who
are not party to the Rome Statute, de facto immune from a SC referral,
and involved in commission of international crimes are the weakest link
in the international community. If national prosecutions do not take place
at the domestic level, under the “heads” of either territorial, active or passive nationality, protective, or universal jurisdiction, the fight against impunity is spoiled by an important jurisdictional gap. That the ICC is able
to fill this jurisdictional gap, thanks to the territorial jurisdiction it has
over the 123 States parties to the Rome Statute,349 is important. The situations in Georgia and Afghanistan, which involve crimes committed by
Russian and U.S. troops, respectively, have the potential to partly close
these impunities and process legitimacy gaps. However, such prosecution
will probably be followed by non-cooperation from Russia and the U.S.,
which will most likely justify their defects as source legitimacy issues.
Nonetheless, this source legitimacy deficit would be compensated for by
a strong process legitimacy, which by the same token, would mean that
the ICC is closer to becoming a weakest link GPG.
According to its current structure, the ICC is an aggregate effort
GPG with some weak links when the SC refers a situation to it. However,
the SC has failed to respond to the role entrusted to it in the fight against
impunity. The SC has not only never adopted a Chapter VII referral
against its self-interest it has never followed up with measures against

347. The issuance of annual report on preliminary examination by the OTP – although not
formally provided by the Statute - is thus welcome for such purpose. For a discussion of the preliminary examination, see Carsten Stahn, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t Challenges and
Critiques of Preliminary Examinations at the ICC, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 413 (2017).
348. See e.g. Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10-451, Decision on Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court, n. 41 (Oct. 26, 2011) (“the referring party (the Security Council in [the situation of Darfur]) when referring a situation to the Court submits that situation to the
entire legal framework of the Court, not to its own interests.”). See also Alexandre Skander Galand,
The Situation Concerning the Islamic State: Carte Blanche for the ICC if the Security Council
Refers?, EJIL TALK! (May 27, 2015), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-situation-concerning-isis-carteblanche-for-the-icc-if-the-security- council-refers/.
349. See Status of Treaties, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. TREATY
COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII10&chapter=18&clang=_en (last updated Feb. 24, 2018).
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States that failed to comply with its referrals and their ensuing obligations.350 It has also neglected to take seriously the repetitive calls from
African States to use Article 16 of the Rome Statute, which is the crux of
an outcome legitimacy concern the Court has to confront.351
C. Distributive Cost to be Assumed Out of the Outcomes of the Court’s
Action
Although legal arguments have been used to challenge the outcome
legitimacy of the Court’s decisions, the crux of the disagreements over
the ICC involvement in our case studies rest on moral justifications. Failures to cooperate with the Court in the situations in Sudan, Libya and
Kenya appear to lie mostly on the destabilizing effect of the Court’s intervention within their domestic jurisdiction. In Sudan and Kenya—not
in Libya, despite the ongoing civil war that followed the ICC’s and
NATO’s interventions—it has been questioned whether the ICC jurisdiction is positively affecting another GPG, which is also arguably enshrined
in the Rome Statute, but disregarded by the ICC Prosecutor, 352 that is
peace.
It is often claimed that one of the goals of the ICC is the promotion
of peace and security.353 In addition to their determination to put an end
to impunity for perpetrators of crimes that shock the conscience of the
international community, the Statute’s drafters recognized in the preamble, “that such grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well-being
of the world.”354 The crucial role given to the SC to refer situations or
defer proceedings when international peace and security demands it, emphasize that the Court actions were envisaged as tools to promote peace.
Accordingly, the Rome Statute would postulate peace and justice as two
of the ICC goals.355 These two GPGs can be conceived as complementary
but also rival; if attaining justice comes at the price of sacrificing peace,
it raises the issues of outcome legitimacy and of distributive conflicts.
350. See UN Security Council: Address Inconsistency in ICC Referrals, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (Oct. 16, 2012), https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/10/16/un-security-council-address-inconsistency-icc-referrals.
351. See Manisuli Ssenyonjo, The Rise of the African Union Opposition to the International
Criminal Court’s Investigations and Prosecutions of African Leaders, 13 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 385,
390-391 (2013).
352. See OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR OF THE ICC, POLICY PAPER ON THE INTERESTS OF
JUSTICE, 9 (Sept. 2007) (Prosecutor Ocampo opined that “the broader matter of international peace
and security is not the responsibility of the Prosecutor; it falls within the mandate of other institutions.”)
353. See SHANY, supra note 164, at 230.
354. Rome Statute, supra note 4, pmbl.
355. See SHANY, supra note 164, at 230.
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Distributive problems can arise in decisions over the provisions of GPGs
when the pursuit of different GPGs conflict with each other.356 Competing
GPGs, when they lead to clashing results, require institutional choices as
to which GPGs need to be traded-off.
According to Akhavan, the ICC may contribute to peace by preventing hostilities; isolating the individual or group responsible for atrocities
and stigmatizing the criminal conduct or the group responsible for atrocities.357 Using empirical evidence, Akhavan argues that the issuance of
arrest warrants and convictions of certain individuals may stigmatize
their criminal conduct, discredit them, and contain destabilizing political
forces.358 In addition to actual prosecutions, the threat of ICC investigation and prosecution may contribute, Akhavan argues, to preventing escalation of conflicts.359 If these results can be achieved through international criminal justice, the interventions of the ICC in certain situations
can be said to be effective. However, a leading criticism of international
criminal tribunals and courts is that they impede peace settlements and
thus prolong atrocities.360 It has often been observed that “arrest warrants
that are difficult to enforce may make conflict more intractable, and thus
may make the resolution of conflict, necessary for the ending of crime,
more difficult.”361 This dialectic reflects the recurrent debate about “peace
versus justice.”362 If these two competing results can be achieved through
international criminal justice, the interventions of the ICC in certain situations can be said to be legitimate. If, on the contrary, the fight against
impunity appears to seriously unsettle a peaceful settlement, the international community is called to calculate the distributive cost of opting for
justice instead of peace or vice versa.
The Rome Statute provides for one mechanism to defer to peace and
two loopholes where peace could be favored over criminal accountability. Firstly, the Prosecutor can decline to prosecute on the ground that it
356. See Shaffer, supra note 291, at 681-83; see also MARK A. POLLACK, & GREGORY C.
SHAFFER, WHEN COOPERATION FAILS 113-133 (2009).
357. See Akhavan, supra note 30, at 628; see also Payam Akhavan, The Lord’s Resistance
Army Case: Uganda’s Submission of the First State Referral to the International Criminal Court,
99 AM. JOUR. INT’L L. 403 (2005) [hereinafter Lord’s Resistance Army Case].
358. See Lord’s Resistance Army Case, supra note 357; see also Philipp Kastner, Armed Conflicts and Referrals to the International Criminal Court: From Measuring Impact to Emerging Legal Obligations, 12 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 479 (2014).
359. See Lord’s Resistance Army Case, supra note 357.
360. See Line Engbo Gissel, Justice Tides: How and When Levels of ICC Involvement Affect
Peace Processes, 9 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 428, 429 (2015).
361. Sarah Nouwen & Wouter Werner, Monopolizing Global Justice: International Criminal
Law as Challenge to Human Diversity, 13 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 157, 169 (2015).
362. See Mirjan Damaska, What Is the Point of International Criminal Justice, 83 CHIC. KENT.
L. REV. 329, 331-332 (2008).
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would not serve “the interests of justice.”363 The concept of the “interests
of justice” has been generally conceived as broader than simply entailing
retributive criminal justice.364 Matthew Brubacher argued that “the term
‘in the interests of justice’ also requires the Prosecutor to take account of
the broader interests of the international community, including the potential political ramifications of investigation on the political environment
of the state over which he is exercising jurisdiction.”365 But, the Prosecutor has opined that “the broader matter of international peace and security
is not the responsibility of the Prosecutor; it falls within the mandate of
other institutions.”366 In other words, the OTP considers that peace legally
falls under the primary responsibility of the SC.367
Secondly, if an alternative mechanism, such as a truth and reconciliation commission, is used in a manner that would meet the purpose of
accountability, it may be considered as a “genuine” proceeding under the
admissibility test.368 The possibility that truth and reconciliation commissions could fit within the complementarity regime of the ICC was indeed
proposed by South Africa and other delegations during the Rome Statute’s negotiations.369 The controversial character underlying this issue
was sidestepped by not explicitly recognizing it in Article 17.370 Still,
Robinson argues that a “narrow doorway” was left for the Court to consider whether such a procedure was indeed a “genuine” effort to do justice.371 It is still unclear whether the Court will accept that amnesties issued within the framework of a truth and reconciliation commission are
acceptable, and in particular, are not issued with an intent to shield perpetrators from justice.372

363. Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 53(2)(c).
364. See Darryl Robinson, Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and
the International Criminal Court, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 481, 488 (2003); see also Matthew R. Brubacher, Prosecutorial Discretion within the International Criminal Court, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST.
71, 81 (2004); see also Luc Côté, International Justice: Tightening Up the Rules of the Game, 81
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 133, 142 (2006).
365. Brubacher, supra note 364, at 81.
366. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR OF THE ICC, supra note 352, ¶ 9.
367. See U.N. Charter, art. 24; see also Danielle E. Goldstone, Embracing Impasse: Admissibility, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Lessons of Uganda for the International Criminal Court,
22 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 761, 777 n. 130 (2008) (describing that, in the situation in Uganda, the
OTP inferred that he might consider pulling out if “a solution to end violence [is found] and if the
prosecution is not serving the interest of justice’”).
368. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 17.
369. See Robinson, supra note 364, at 489-99.
370. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 17.
371. See Robinson, supra note 364, at 499.
372. See WILLIAM SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
199 (4th ed. 2011); see also Robinson, supra note 364, at 500-01.
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Thirdly, if the SC determines that ICC investigation or prosecution
is a threat to international peace and security, it can suspend the Court
action for a renewable one-year period.373 A SC deferral of the proceedings under Article 16 of the Rome Statute depends on a consensus from
the P-5 members that Chapter VII of the UN Charter should be activated.374 This would require that the SC determines that the ICC proceedings constitute a threat to international peace and security, a claim that
might indeed look paradoxical; in particular, in a situation initially referred by the SC under Article 13(b).375
While the two first options—integrating peace concerns within the
Prosecutor’s discretion and availing truth and reconciliation within the
inadmissibility test—put pressure on the Court’s fulfillment of its mandate, the last option—having requests for deferral taken seriously—puts
the burden on the SC to fulfill its role. When requesting the SC to defer
the ICC proceedings against Al-Bashir, the AU emphasized that the SC
had to “ensure that the ongoing peace efforts are not jeopardized, as well
as the fact that, in the current circumstances, a prosecution may not be in
the interest of the victims and justice.”376 The SC’s lack of express response to the AU’s request elicited the latter to decide that its member
states “shall not cooperate” with the ICC for the arrest and surrender of
Al-Bashir.377 As Helfer and Showalter put it, “feelings of disrespect
[were] aroused by the UNSC’s non-responsiveness.”378 The AU reaction
to the arrest warrant against Gaddafi did not even test the SC’s ears towards its argument in favor of peace; but rather, asked for a deferral while
simultaneously requesting that member states do not cooperate in the execution of the arrest warrant.379 Once again the SC failed to act upon, either in a positive or negative way, the AU’s request for deferral. In contrast, the SC response to Kenya’s request endorsed by the AU 380 for a

373. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 16.
374. See id. art 16; see also UN Charter, art. 27.
375. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, arts. 13(b) & 16; see also UN Charter, Ch. VII.
376. Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Communique of the 142nd Meeting, supra note 23, ¶ 11, Doc. PSC/MIN/Comm (CXLII) (July 21, 2008).
377. Assembly of the African Union, Thirteenth Ordinary Session, Decision on the Meeting of
African States Parties to the Statute of the International Criminal Court, ¶ 10, Doc. Assembly/AU
/Dec.245(XIII) Rev.1, (July 3, 2009). See also Manisuli Ssenyonjo, The Rise of the African Union
Opposition to the International Criminal Court’s Investigations and Prosecutions of African Leaders, 13 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 385, 388 (2013).
378. Helfer & Showalter, supra note 269, at 46.
379. See Assembly of the African Union, 17th Sess., supra note 63, ¶ 6.
380. See id.; see also Assembly of the African Union, Decision on the Implementation of the
Decisions on the International Criminal Court, ¶ 4, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.419 (XIX) (Jan.
31, 2011); see also Assembly of the African Union, Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the
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deferral of the proceedings against Kenyatta and Ruto was received with
seven States in favor and eight abstentions.381
While the SC has been ready to exercise its referral powers in certain
situations, its use of the deferral power as provided in the Rome Statute,
has been lacking. Less than two weeks after the Statute’s entry into force,
the SC, through Resolutions 1422 and 1487, requested that the ICC not
investigate or prosecute any peacekeeper from States not party to the
Rome Statute, and expressed its “intention to renew . . . the request[s]
under the same conditions each 1 July for further 12-month periods.”382
The resolutions were met with great criticism and even deemed illegal by
many since they did not invoke any specific threat to international peace
and security justifying the use of Chapter VII and Article 16 Rome Statute.383 It is indeed the discriminatory use of Article 16 Rome Statute by
the SC that poses a significant challenge to the legitimacy of the ICC. Not
only is this unequal practice raising process legitimacy concerns but it
also shows that there is a lack of agreed global governance policies over
the distributive conflicts stemming from the fight against impunity. The
outcome legitimacy of the ICC is thus criticized due to the SC’s inability
to speak with one voice about the distributive choice between peace and
justice it faces.
There are certainly legal considerations in the Rome Statute over
which the OTP must show political sensitivities; especially it should try
to avoid obstructing peaceful resolution to an ongoing conflict. 384 While
the ICC has become imperative in peaceful resolutions of conflicts, deferring to peace instead of immediate justice is also an issue that must be
considered in the peacemaking process.385 However, the primary institutional mandate of the ICC is indeed to contribute to the fight against impunity for the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.386 If the fight against impunity as a GPG interferes
with the pursuit of peace, another GPG, it should be the institution that
International Criminal Court (ICC), Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union,
Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1 (Oct. 12, 2013).
381. Hence, it only lacked two additional affirmative votes needed for such resolution, see S.C.
7060th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.7060 (Nov. 15, 2013).
382. S.C. Res. 1422, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1422 (July 12, 2002); SC Resolution 1487, UN Doc.
S/RES/1487 (June 12, 2003).
383. See Carsten Stahn, The Ambiguities of Security Council Resolution 1422, 14 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 85, 89 (2003); see also Marc Weller, Undoing the Global Constitution: UN Security Council
Action on the International Criminal Court, 78 INT’L AFF. 693, 708 (2002).
384. See Brubacher, supra note 364, at 81; see also Côté, supra note 364, at 142–43; see also
Goldstone, supra note 367, at 790; see also Kastner, supra note 357, at 479.
385. See Kastner, supra note 358, at 484-485.
386. See id. at 480.
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has the mandate to balance both which should intervene: the SC. To sum
up, the outcome legitimacy issue facing the Court is mostly due to the
SC’s failure to assume its responsibility as a provider of the fight against
impunity and peace.
CONCLUSION
This article showed that the ICC’s situation in Darfur, Libya and
Kenya appear to suffer from three legitimacy deficits: source, process,
and outcome legitimacy. This article argued that the source and process
legitimacy issues are due to the inadequacy of creating an aggregate effort
(intermediate) GPG for a weakest link GPG. Due to the entanglement
between source and process legitimacy, this article considered tying both
to enhance cooperation with the Court. At first glance, a compliance pull
could be generated by, when source legitimacy is lacking, strictly sticking
to the State’s interest in the prosecutorial discretion as to who to prosecute. The article showed that such calculations are already made with regards to so-called self-referrals (i.e., where source legitimacy is not questioned). However, the article argued that the latter option would create a
global public bad, as it entails negative externalities and excludes some
victims from benefitting from the Court.
While assessing the outcome legitimacy of the Court’s intervention
in the situations under scrutiny, it became clear that the peace versus justice theorem was at the crux of non-compliance issues. The ICC cannot
secure peace, but it may contribute to it as one of the many tools that
might be used to come closer to peace in the long term. 387 Deciding
whether the distributive costs of the fight against impunity requires a
trade-off in favor of peace is, according to the Rome Statute as well as
the UN Charter, lying on the SC. It is plausible that the SC must start
using its power to defer investigations and prosecutions under Article 16
of the Rome Statute in situations where the ICC’s source, process, and
outcome legitimacy are weak. In 2009, before the beginning of the situations in Kenya and Libya, but right after the SC’s silence regarding the
request to defer the proceedings against Al-Bashir, South Africa had submitted—on behalf of the AU—a proposal for amending Article 16 of the
Rome Statute.388 South Africa’s proposal provided that where the SC
would fail to decide on a request for deferral, the UN General Assembly

387. See id. at 482-84.
388. South Africa: Proposal of Amendment, UN Doc. C.N.851.2009.TREATIES-10 (Nov. 30,
2009).
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would be allowed to assume the responsibility of the SC under Article 16
and defer proceedings before the ICC.389
Overall, the legitimacy talks over the ICC ultimately point out that
the crux of the problem is the SC. Its participation in ICC’s business is
necessary for the effective supply of the fight against impunity as a GPG.
However, the SC is also responsible for the lack of a consistent and universal fight against impunity and a coherent policy when this GPG must
be traded off with peace.

389. See id. at 6.

